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ENDING DISPARITIES AND ACHIEVING JUSTICE FOR
INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
Sheila E. Shea & Robert Goldman*
INTRODUCTION
The intersection of crime and mental disabilities is a topic of
intense public scrutiny and concern.' It is well known that the
widespread closure of psychiatric hospitals led to an increase in the
arrest and incarceration of individuals with mental illness.2
Nationally, as the number of state hospital beds that remain open
"has fallen to its lowest level on record, . .. mentally ill individuals
inside and outside the criminal justice system" compete for scarce
resources in "a bed shell game with life-and-death implications."
3
Against this backdrop, attorneys who practice in New York
encounter statutory schemes governing the adjudication and
retention of incapacitated defendants and those determined to not
be responsible because of "mental disease or defect"4 that are
confounding even to the most experienced counsel. Acquiring
proficiency in this discrete area of law must be coupled with
awareness that defendants with mental disabilities invariably
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She is currently the director of the Mental Hygiene Legal Service for the Third Judicial
Department, Albany, New York. Robert Goldman, J.D., Psy.D, is an attorney and
psychologist. He has a private practice and is the Executive Director of the Tikkun Long
Island. All opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and not of any agency or
governmental entity. The authors wish to thank Susan Bryant, Christy Coe, Mardi
Crawford, Donna Hall, Maribeth Hunt, Sadie Ishee, Valentina Morales, and Veronica Pierce
for their contributions to this article.
I See Michael L. Perlin, "Wisdom is thrown into Jail": Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to
Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 343,
344-45, 364-65 (2013).
2 See id. at 344-45; Ralph Slovenko, The Transinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill, 29
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 641, 657, 660 (2003); Sol Wachtler & Keri Bagala, From the Asylum to
Solitary: Transinstitutionalization, 77 ALB. L. REV. 915, 916 (2014).
3 DORIS A. FULLER ET AL., GOING, GOING, GONE: TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ELIMINATING STATE PSYCHIATRIC BEDS 1, 9 (2016), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/
storage/documents/going-going-gone.pdf.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 330.20(2), 730.10(1) (McKinney 2017) (discussing those found




confront widespread societal prejudices, myths, and stereotypes
regarding their circumstances, such as that those who invoke
mental status defenses are malingering or inherently dangerous.5
"The [American] public's outrage [in 1981] over a jurisprudential
system that could allow a defendant who shot an American
President on national television to plead 'not guilty' became a 'river
of fury' after the jury's verdict was announced."6 The conditional
release of John Hinckley from St. Elizabeth's Hospital on
September 10, 2016, thirty-five years after he shot former President
Ronald Regan and three others, is a watershed moment that has
caused renewed public criticism of the insanity defense.7
Criminal defendants with mental disabilities have been "deprived
of treatment, discriminated against, [and] mistreated."8 They have
also been subjected to over-punishment because of the harms they
endure while incarcerated.9 The common view that dangerous
propensities are associated with mental illness and that future risk
can be predicted is not evidence-based.1 0
This article will review the nature of mental disabilities and their
prevalence in the criminal justice system, and will introduce
fundamental concepts regarding the defense of individuals with
mental disabilities. New York State statutes governing the
retention, care, and treatment of incapacitated defendants and
I See Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw" The Impact of the ADA on the
Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193,
234-35 (2000).
6 Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from Me": The Insanity Defense,
the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV.
1375, 1381 (1997). In a poll taken in the wake of Hinckley's acquittal, seventy-five percent of
those questioned disapproved of laws allowing people to be found not guilty by reason of
insanity. See Peter Margulies, The "Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad":
Procedures for the Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees after Jones v. United
States, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 793, 794 n.3 (1984). Dissatisfaction-though somewhat more
muted-was also expressed by public officials. See Steven V. Roberts, High U.S. Officials
Express Outrage, Asking for New Law on Insanity Plea, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1982, at B6.
I See United States v. Hinckley, No. 81-0306, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97906, at *4 (D.D.C.
July 27, 2016); Spencer S. Hsu & Ann E. Marimow, Would-be Reagan Assassin John Hinckley




8 See June Resnick German & Anne C. Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of
Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1074 (1976).
9 See E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental
Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 170 (2013).
10 See Seena Fazel et al., Use of Risk Assessment Instruments to Predict Violence and
Antisocial Behavior in 73 Samples Involving 24827 People: Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis, 345 BRIT. MED. J. e4692 (2012); Mohit Varshney et al., Violence and Mental Illness:
What is the True Story?, 70 J. EPIDEMIOL & COMMUNITY HEALTH 223, 225 (2016).
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those found not guilty by reason of insanity will be explored in
depth along with proposals for chapter amendments to this state's
Criminal Procedure Law. Theory and practice are examined
together toward the goal of ending disparities in outcomes for
individuals with mental disabilities in the criminal justice system.
This article's conclusion is that miscarriages of justice for those with
mental disabilities can be avoided by reform of statutory schemes,
education of the bench and bar regarding the nature and
consequences of mental disabilities, and by embracing concepts of
therapeutic justice not yet integrated into our criminal justice
system."
I. THE NATURE OF MENTAL DISABILITIES
Crucial to achieving justice for any person alleged to be mentally
disabled and subject to criminal prosecution is an understanding of
the distinctions between psychiatric illnesses, developmental
disabilities, and neurological injuries or disorders, all of which can
impede a person's capacity. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders ("DSM"), 12 provides a common nomenclature for
identifying categories of mental disorders and their diagnostic
criteria. "Because impairments, abilities and disabilities vary
widely within diagnostic category[, the] assignment of a particular
diagnosis does not imply a specific level of impairment or disability
[that may manifest itself in an individual.]" 13
Further, distinctions between clinical and legal definitions of
mental disorders are subtle and warrant examination.14  For
instance, the New York State Mental Hygiene Law defines "mental
disability" as: "[M]ental illness, intellectual disability,
developmental disability, alcoholism, substance dependence, or
chemical dependence."1 5 Its clinical corollary would be a "mental
11 The foundational concepts in this article were first explored in a prior article written by
the author, entitled: "Defense Practice Tips: Representing Clients with Mental Disabilities."
See Sheila E. Shea, Defense Practice Tips: Representing Clients with Mental Disabilities, in 28
N.Y. STATE DEF. ASs'N, PUBLIC DEFENSE BACKUP CENTER REPORT 8-15 (Jan.-Apr. 2013). As
such, the author frequently refers back to that writing in this article.
12 AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
13 See id. at 25. In fact, the DSM contains a cautionary statement for its forensic use
because there is an "imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and
the information contained in a clinical diagnosis." Id.
14 See Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Detention: Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 885, 888-89 (2011).
15 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03(3) (McKinney 2017).
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disorder," defined by the DSM as: "[A] syndrome characterized by
clinically significant disturbance in an individual's cognition,
emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying
mental functioning."16 The legal definition of "mental illness" in
New York State is: "[A]n affliction with a mental disease or mental
condition which is manifested by a disorder or disturbance in
behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment to such an extent that the
person afflicted requires care, treatment and rehabilitation."1 7
Some mental illnesses are recurring-such as major depressive
disorder.18 But others, including schizophrenia, typically last a
lifetime-even with treatment.19
Mental disorders as defined by the DSM also include
developmental disabilities for which an initial diagnosis typically
occurs at some point in childhood.20 Several specific conditions that
constitute developmental disabilities within the meaning of New
York State law include intellectual disability, cerebral palsy,
epilepsy, and autism.21  In addition, to properly diagnose a
developmental disability, the person's condition must originate prior
to the age of twenty-two, continue or be expected to continue for
indefinitely, and must also present a "substantial handicap" to
"such person's ability to function normally in society."22 Finally,
mental disorders also include cognitive disorders.23  These are
disorders characterized by serious impairments in memory or
cognitive functioning "that are acquired rather than
developmental."24 Common symptoms may include disorientation,
confusion, speech and language problems, forgetfulness, or memory
loss. 25
16 DSM-5, supra note 12, at 20.
17 MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03(20).
18 See DSM-5, supra note 12, at 165; Depression, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/depressionlindex.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
19 See Schizophrenia, NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/
topics/schizophrenialindex.shtm1 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
20 See DSM-5, supra note 12, at 31.
21 MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03(22).
22 Id.
23 DSM-5, supra note 12, at 591. In the DSM, this category of disorders was referred to as:
"Dementia, Delirium, Amenestic, and Other Cognitive Disorders." Id.
24 Id.
25 See People v. Phillips, 948 N.E.2d 428, 430-31 (N.Y. 2011) (noting the effect that
transcortical motor aphasia, a permanent brain injury, had on defendant's language skills,
speech skills, and ability to comprehend trial proceedings); DSM-5, supra note 12, at 594-95
tbl.1.
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Personality disorders, in contrast, are not usually "conditions that
render defendants incompetent to stand trial" or relieve them of
criminal responsibility.26 In some cases, a defendant may have
multiple diagnoses, requiring fact finding and clinical opinion as to
the disorder or condition primarily contributing to the defendant's
incapacity.27  In any particular case, the clinical and legal
terminology discussed above requires contextual application to
appreciate and understand the potential cause of a person's alleged
diminished mental capacity and his or her ability to stand trial or
be held criminally responsible for his or her actions.28
II. PREVALENCE OF MENTAL DISABILITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Forty-four of fifty states surveyed in 2008 reported that there was
at least one jail that was holding more mentally ill individuals than
the single largest psychiatric hospital in that state.29 This sobering
statistic is reflective of a national trend demonstrating that the rate
of jail and prison incarceration increased as the rate of psychiatric
hospitalization decreased.30 Many severely mentally ill persons who
come to the attention of law enforcement receive their inpatient
care in jails and prisons, at least in part, because of a dramatic
reduction of psychiatric inpatient beds.31  The transformation of
persons with severe and persistent mental illness from prisoners to
patients to prisoners again is a tragedy reflected in the arc of
history:
From 1770 to 1820 in the United States, mentally ill persons
were routinely confined in prisons and jails. Because this
practice was regarded as inhumane and problematic, until
1970, such persons were routinely confined in hospitals.
26 Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric
Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S13, (2007);
see also Paul Anthony Moran, The Epidemiology of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 34 SOc.
PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 231, 234 (1999) (estimating that between forty
and sixty percent of the male prison population is diagnosable with Antisocial Personality
Disorder).
27 DSM-5, supra note 12, at 20-23; Mossman et al., supra note 26, at S49-S50 (explaining
the factual inquiry involved in rendering a diagnosis and indicating the role that psychiatric
diagnoses serves in evaluating adjudicative competence).
28 See Mossman et al., supra note 26, at S45.
29 E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN
PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY 7 (2014).
30 See H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, The Shift of Psychiatric Inpatient Care
from Hospitals to Jails and Prisons, 33 J. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 529, 529 (2005).
31 See id. at 530.
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Since 1970, we have returned to the earlier practice of
routinely confining such persons in prisons and jails.
In 2012, there were estimated to be 356,268 inmates with
severe mental illness in prisons and jails [in the United
States]. There were also approximately 35,000 patients with
severe mental illness in state psychiatric hospitals. Thus,
the number of mentally ill persons in prisons and jails was
10 times the number remaining in state hospitals.32
As stated by one author, there were compelling reasons to close
the asylums in the United States, but implementing
deinstitutionalization in this country turned out to be a disaster.33
Specifically, "[s]tate governments, previously responsible for
covering the costs of mental health care, exploited
deinstitutionalization to offload responsibility and cost. . . .
Deinstitutionalization turned into transinstitutionalization-at first
to nursing homes for the older patients,34 then to prisons for the
younger ones."35
A. Sentence-Serving Inmates in New York State
As of January 1, 2016, there were 52,340 inmates in the custody
of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
("DOCCS") in New York State and approximately twenty percent
(10,249) were on the caseload of the Office of Mental Health
("OMH"); of those, roughly twenty-two percent (2,322) were
32 See TORREY ET AL., supra note 29, at 6; see also Deborah J. Chard-Wierschem, N.Y.S.
Office for People with Developmental Disabilities, Presentation: Jail v. Beds: How to Stop the
Pendulum Long Enough for Transformative Discussion on Community Service Development
for Individuals with Mental Illness and Developmental Disabilities, at slide 5 (Oct. 23, 2015).
3 Allen Frances, World's Best-and Worst-Places to Be Mentally Ill, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES
(Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/blogs.world's-best-and-worst-places-be-
mentally-ill; see TORREY ET AL., supra note 29, at 6.
34 In New York, hundreds of state hospital patients were transferred to nursing homes in
other states to reduce the inpatient psychiatric center census and achieve fiscal savings. See,
e.g., Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280, 286-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Clifford J. Levy, New
York Exports Mentally Ill, Shifting Burden to Other States, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/17/nyregion/new-york-exports-mentally-ill-shifting-burden-
to-other-states.html.
35 Frances, supra note 33. Frances also observed that still even more people "fell through
the cracks and became chronically homeless." Id. This article draws no conclusion as to
whether deinstitutionalization caused homelessness, because there is considerable debate on
this subject. See Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A
Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 69 (1991) (discussing the impact of
institutionalization on homelessness and the distortion of policies addressing the homeless).
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identified as having serious mental illness.36 The prevalence of
mental disabilities among women inmates was more than twice as
high as men, according to DOCCS.3 7 Inmates with mental illness
may reside in general population, residential mental health
treatment units, and intermediate care programs.38 Others may
require inpatient care and treatment at the 208-bed Central New
York Psychiatric Center.39 DOCCS also operates special needs
units for inmates with developmental disabilities.40
Once incarcerated, individuals with developmental disabilities
are vulnerable to victimization and theft by other inmates, and are
more likely to be sexually assaulted or exploited to violate
regulations by other inmates.41 "Because of limited understanding,
inmates with intellectual and developmental disabilities may have
greater difficulty following rules when incarcerated, resulting in
longer sentences and a lower likelihood of parole."42 Similarly,
prison has been described as a "toxic environment" for individuals
with serious mental illness.43 Studies reveal that individuals with
major mental illnesses, as a class, face a substantial likelihood of
incurring serious harm while incarcerated and are substantially
more likely to suffer serious harms than non-ill prisoners.44
3 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF CORRS. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, UNDER CUSTODY REPORT:
PROFILE OF UNDER CUSTODY POPULATION 25 tbl. 19 (2016).
37 See id. at 25.
* See id. at 2 (discussing the different facilities and programs in which inmates reside); see
also N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF CORRS. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, PROFILE OF INMATES DESIGNATED AS
SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL UNDER CUSTODY 12-13 app. A (2013) (discussing, inter alia,
residential mental health treatment units and intermediate care programs for inmates with
serious mental illnesses).
39 N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF CORES. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, supra note 38, at 15 app. A; Donna
L. Hall et al., Predictors of General and Violent Recidivism among SMI Prisoners Returning to
Communities in New York State, 40 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 221, 223 (2012) (describing
treatment and reentry of prisoners with mental illness in New York State).
40 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF CORRS. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, supra note 38, at 14 app. A. The
Special Needs Units are located at "Wende (52 beds), Sullivan (64 beds), . . . Clinton (20 beds),
... and Woodbourne (50 beds)" correctional facilities. Id.
41 James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 414, 479-80, nn.365-67 (1985); Joan Petersilia, Justice for All? Offenders with
Mental Retardation and the California Corrections System, 77 PRISON J. 358, 361-62 (1997).
42 Anna Scheyett et al., Are We There Yet? Screening Processes for Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities in Jail Settings, 47 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 13,
14 (2009); accord Petersilia, supra note 41, at 361-62.
43 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS 53 (2003), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usal003.pdf ("Mental health
experts have described prisons as a 'toxic' environment for the seriously mentally ill."); Fox
Butterfield, Study Finds Hundreds of Thousands of Inmates Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22,
2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/22/us/study-finds-hundreds-of-thousands-of-inmates-
mentally-ill.html.
- See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 43, at 56-59; Butterfield, supra note 43.
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Alarmingly, a disproportionate number of mentally ill individuals
are still exposed to disciplinary confinement in special housing units
("SHU"), also known as solitary confinement.45 Uninterrupted
cycles of discipline, psychiatric deterioration, crisis care, and further
punishment through disciplinary sanctions are often experienced by
inmates with serious mental illness in correctional settings.46
B. Detainees in Local Jails
There are numerous studies examining the prevalence of mental
illness among adults confined in local jails across the United
States.47 As one example, a 2006 Department of Justice ("DOJ")
survey reflected that "24% of jail inmates, . . . reported at least one
symptom of [a] psychotic disorder."48 Similarly, the Council of State
Governments released estimates on the prevalence of adults with
serious mental illnesses in jails.49 Among its key findings were that
researchers documented serious mental illness in "14.5 percent of
the men and 31 percent of the women [in local jails], which taken
together, compris[ed] 16.9 percent of those studied."5 0 These rates
were "in excess of three to six times those found in the general
population."5 1 According to the Council of State Governments, "[i]f
these estimates are applied to the 13 million jail admissions
reported in 2007 . .. more than 2 million bookings of a person with a
serious mental illness occur annually."52
6 Wachtler & Bagala, supra note 2, at 917.
- See Johnston, supra note 9, at 169-78; cf. Private Settlement Agreement at 12-15,
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2007) (No.
02 Civ. 4002) (proposing increased protections for inmates with mental health issues).
47 E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND PRISONS
THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 3-6 (2010).
48 DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 2 (2006).
49 Press Release, The Council of State Gov'ts: Justice Ctr., Council of State Governments
Justice Center Releases Estimates on the Prevalence of Adults with Serious Mental Illnesses





"Serious mental illness" ... refer[red] to the presence of one or more of the following
diagnoses: bipolar disorder, schizophrenia spectrum disorders, and major depression.
Estimates [did] not include other less serious mental illnesses, such as anxiety
disorders . . . adjustment disorders, or acute reactive psychiatric conditions, such as
suicidal thinking, which also represent[s] significant jail management concerns.
Id. The study sites included the Albany, Rensselaer, and Monroe County jails in New York
State. See id.
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For the vast majority of mentally ill people incarcerated in local
jails, the experience varies from being "merely negative to ...
catastrophic."53 There has been intense scrutiny of Rikers Island,
New York City's main jail complex.5 4 "In 1997, about 33,000
prisoners, which was about 25% of the total, received mental health
treatment in the New York City jails."5 5 By 2014, the estimate had
grown so that thirty-eight percent of the overall jail population in
New York City was considered to have a mental illness.56 In
December 2014, the New York City Mayor's Task Force on
Behavioral Health and the Criminal Justice System's Action Plan57
announced a comprehensive program to, among other things, reduce
the number of people with mental illness "needlessly cycling
through the criminal justice system."5 8
While increased resources may improve outcomes for mentally ill
inmates at Rikers Island, they are still not protected by the SHU
Exclusion Law,5 9 and thus they can be exposed to the harsh
conditions of solitary confinement as a disciplinary sanction.60
Studies also demonstrate that individuals with intellectual and
developmental disabilities are over-represented in jails as well as
prisons.61 This particularly vulnerable population is deserving of
special protections.
63 E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE ABUSE OF
JAILS AS MENTAL HOSPITALS 58 (1992).
- See, e.g., Suman Varandani, NYC Jails Overhaul: Mayor to Spend $130M to Reform
Handling of Mentally Ill in Criminal Justice System, INT'L BUs. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014),
http://www.ibtimes.com/nyc-jails-overhaul-mayor-spend- 130m-reform-handling-mentally-ill-
criminal-justice- 1731740.
55 Brad H. v. City of New York, 712 N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
56 Reducing the Number of People with Behavioral Health Needs Behind Bars, N.Y.C.
MAYOR'S OFF. CRIM. JUST., http://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/criminaljustice/work/bhtf.page (last
visited Mar. 7, 2017).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137 (McKinney 2017).
60 See Wachtler & Bagala, supra note 2, at 919-20, 922-23 (noting that mentally ill
inmates in New York City jails are not protected under the SHU Exclusion Law). According
to a recent change in the minimum standards, though, no inmate in the custody of the New
York City Department of Corrections can be placed in punitive segregation if they have
'serious mental or serious physical conditions." See 40 Rules of N.Y.C. § 1-17 (2017). In place
of punitive segregation, the Department of Corrections and Correctional Health established
the Clinical Alternative to Punitive Segregation ("CAPS") program.
61 See, e.g., William R. Lindsay, Integration of Recent Reviews on Offenders with
Intellectual Disabilities, 15 J. APPLIED RES. INTELL. DISABILITIES 111, 112 (2002).
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C. Adverse Criminal Consequences for Individuals With Mental
Disabilities
As a consequence of being arrested, a person with a mental illness
acquires a criminal record.62 That record no doubt influences the
actions of law enforcement personnel "in subsequent encounters
with the individual and reinforce[s] the tendency to choose the
criminal justice system over the mental health system."63 In other
words, the person with a mental illness is now "criminalized."64 As
succinctly stated by Lamb and Weinberger:
Once severely mentally ill persons are labeled as offenders,
the label may determine not only future law enforcement
decisions but court dispositions as well. It has been our
experience that after such individuals commit a number of
petty and/or nonviolent "crimes," which may well be related
to their mental illness, it is not uncommon for the courts to
be more influenced by the defendants' long "criminal" history
than by their psychiatric illness, and thus sentence them to
jail or state prison. Not only is such a disposition highly
inappropriate and harmful to persons with severe mental
illness, but the label of criminal is further reinforced.65
The people with mental illness who are most likely to be
criminalized are those who are resistant to treatment or who have a
history of assaultive behavior.66 Individuals with intellectual and
other developmental disabilities also face multiple risks as a result
of their interactions with the criminal justice system.67 "Limited
understanding of legal terms and processes, combined with
difficulties processing information, may result in their giving up
rights without understanding the [legal] consequences [of their
decisions] and put them at [greater] risk of wrongful conviction."68
Their circumstances are further "complicated by the fact that ...
individuals" with intellectual and other developmental disabilities
may have "heightened suggestibility . . . increasing their risk of
confessing to a crime they did not actually commit."69




66 See H. Richard Lamb & Robert W. Grant, The Mentally Ill in an Urban County Jail, 39
ARCHIVEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 17, 18-19 (1982).
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III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW ADMISSION AND RETENTION IN NEW
YORK
While psychiatric hospital and developmental center beds are
closing,7 0 those facilities that do remain open are with greater
frequency occupied by people referred for admission from the
criminal justice system.71 "This trend also is occurring in New York
State . . . , with forensic referrals comprising an increasing portion
of the state's civil (nonforensic) psychiatric hospital census."72 Thus,
understanding the statutory procedures for the admission and
retention of incapacitated defendants found not responsible is
crucial to achieving client objectives in any individual case and
promoting justice.
A. Article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law
"It is to the Court a finding of phantom fitness with no more
substance than a bubble on a baby's wand."73
With this finding, the Kings County Supreme Court in People v.
A.S. held that the state psychologist had incorrectly assessed A.S.
as being "restored to capacity."74 This case demonstrated that
representing a mentally disabled defendant presented unique
challenges. A.S. was intellectually disabled (i.e., reading at the first
grade level),75 and was charged with arson at sixteen years of
age7 6-yet despite A.S.'s serious disabilities and the opinions of a
psychiatric examiner and a psychologist from the Office for People
with Developmental Disabilities ("OPWDD")," the Commissioner
insisted on A.S.'s competence and certified him as fit to proceed.7
8
The Kings County Supreme Court held otherwise, perceiving no
70 See Assemb. B. 3006-D, 236th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013) (enacted); Assemb. B. 9056-D,
235th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012) (enacted).
71 FULLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 2; Richard Miraglia & Donna Hall, The Effect of Length
of Hospitalization on Re-arrest among Insanity Plea Acquittees, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 524, 524 (2011).
72 Miraglia & Hall, supra note 71, at 524.








prospect of future competence on behalf of the defendant.79
The case of A.S. highlights the challenges associated with
representing a defendant [with mental disabilities]. . . . [The
defendant] had barely achieved a passing score on [a]
Standardized Competency Assessment [tool] . . . after
multiple attempts during his eight[-]year confinement at a
secure developmental center. The defendant's psychiatric
examiner[, as well as an OPWDD-employed psychologist,]
opined that a trial would cause AS "debilitating stress." . . .
[N]onetheless, the Commissioner persisted in her position
that [the defendant] was competent to stand trial. After
weighing the conflicting expert testimony, the [c]ourt
determined that A.S. was not competent to stand trial,
seizing upon [the defendant's] "fragile, brittle state."
Further, the [c]ourt granted the . .. motion [of the defendant]
for Jackson80 relief on the grounds that it was not likely that
the defendant would attain capacity in the foreseeable
future."8
Despite the absence of exact national statistics:
The case of A.S. is but one of an estimated 60,000 annually[,]
where competency evaluations are ordered in the United
States. . . . Major mental illness, intellectual disability, or
other cognitive limitations are the most frequent causes of
adjudicative incompetence.82
Further:
In New York, a defendant who as a result of mental
disease of defect lacks capacity to understand the
proceedings against him or to assist in his or her own
defense cannot be prosecuted for a criminal offense.
Founded upon [now historical] common law principles, New
York's statutory scheme governing fitness to proceed can be
7 See id.
- Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) ("[A] person charged by a state with a
criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial
cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there
is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is
determined that this is not the case, then the state must either institute the customary civil
confinement proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or
release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably
soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress
toward that goal.").
s Shea, supra note 11, at 8.
82 Id.
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traced back to an 1828 statute which provided that "no
insane person can be tried, sentenced to any punishment, or
punished for any crime or offense while he continues in that
state." Over time, sporadic attention to the laws governing
mentally disabled defendants was said to generate
"incredible confusion" over two fundamental issues: (1) how
to examine the defendant, and (2) what disposition to make
of a defendant found unfit to proceed.
The results of this confusion led to egregious consequences
in some cases. For instance, upon undertaking law reform in
1968, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in
cooperation with Fordham Law School observed that the
former Code of Criminal Procedure made it possible for an
uneducated nineteen-year-old defendant accused of
committing a burglary in Brooklyn in 1901 to be confined
beyond his 83rd birthday in a maximum security institution
operated by the [New York State] Department of Corrections
without ever being afforded an opportunity to prove his
innocence. Characterized as a "forgotten man," this
defendant was denied a speedy trial and periodic judicial
review of his condition, and was confined decades longer
than even proof of his guilt would have supported in an
overcrowded, understaffed state correctional institution.
Many of the deficiencies of the prior Code of Criminal
Procedure were cured in 1970 upon the enactment of the
Criminal Procedure Law . . . . [However,] the process for
determining fitness to proceed, as well as the various
alternatives available to the court to address the
circumstances of an incapacitated defendant, [still] engender
confusion to this day.83
As suggested above, "[p]sychiatric examiners should engage in a
contextual and functional analysis of the defendant's abilities when
assessing [a] person's capacity to stand trial."84  A contextual
analysis is unique to the particular circumstances of a defendant
and the abilities he or she may be expected to demonstrate as a
party to the case.85 In contrast, a functional analysis will address
the defendant's current knowledge of the court proceedings and his
or her ability to assist counsel in providing relevant information,
- Id.




conducting him or herself appropriately in court, and making
rational decisions about his or her defense in consultation with
counsel.86
Psychiatric examiners may employ clinical assessment tools
during a competency evaluation that will vary depending upon the
nature of the defendant's disability.8 7 For example, the MacArthur
Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication ("MacCAT-
CA") and Competence Assessment for Standing Trial for Defendants
with Mental Retardation ("CAST*MR") are "two commonly used
instruments which assess knowledge, understanding, and reasoning
pertaining to court proceedings."8 8
The MacCAT-CA is "a 22-item test that [typically requires] 30 to
45 minutes to administer."89 Futher:
It has three sections: Items 1 through 8 assess the
defendant's understanding . . . [of the role] of the defense
attorney, elements of the offense [and] pleading guilty[].
These items include educational components that allow
evaluation of a defendant's ability to grasp basic, orally
presented information about legal proceedings. Items 9
through 16 assess the defendant's reasoning (e.g., concepts
such as self-defense, possible provocation, and ability to seek
information that informs a choice). Items 17 through 22
address the defendant's appreciation of his specific
circumstances (e.g., his beliefs about the likelihood of being
treated fairly and his rationale for these beliefs).90
The MacCAT-CA has been validated with three groups of criminal
defendants with varying competence levels and mental illness
treatment histories.91 In contrast, the developers of the CAST*MR
were of the opinion that "the open-ended questions used in other
instruments . . . might not properly assess" the capacity of people
with intellectual disabilities.92 In addition:
The developers also thought that the vocabulary of other
- See id.
8 Id.; see Mark Siegert & Kenneth J. Weiss, Who Is an Expert? Competency Evaluations in
Mental Retardation and Borderline Intelligence, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 346, 346
(2007).
8 Shea, supra note 11, at 9; see Richard Rogers & Jill Johansson-Love, Evaluating
Competency to Stand Trial with Evidence-Based Practice, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
450, 453-54, 456 (2009).
89 Mossman et al., supra note 26, at S42.
90 Id.
91 See Rogers & Johansson-Love, supra note 88, at 454.
92 Mossman et al., supra note 26, at S41.
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tests might be too advanced for [defendants with intellectual
disabilities] and that the emphasis on psychiatric symptoms
might not be appropriate for such defendants. The
CAST*MR has 50 items divided into three sections and takes
30 to 45 minutes to administer. The majority of questions
are multiple choice. The first two sections require a fourth-
grade reading level. The first section includes 25 questions
assessing basic legal knowledge ([e.g.,] "What does the judge
do?") and the second section uses the same format to assess
the defendant's ability to assist in his or her defense. The
last section has 10 items designed to assess the defendant's
account of events surrounding the charges (e.g., "What were
you doing that caused you to get arrested?"). A weakness of
[the assessment tool] is that . . . recognition format of the
test may result in overestimation of a defendant's abilities.
As with . . . instruments for evaluation of adjudicative
[in]competence, the MacCAT-CA [and the CAST*MR are] not
supposed to function as . . . stand-alone assessment[s] of
competency to stand trial. . . . [Rather, d]esigners of these
instruments intend that they be used in concert with, rather
than as a substitute for, a more comprehensive clinical
examination.93
"If a defendant is remanded for commitment following a finding
that she is an incapacitated person, it is imperative that the
defendant be [confined in] the custody of the proper state official." 94
In New York, the Commissioner of the OMH and the Commissioner
of the OPWDD are authorized to take custody of incapacitated
defendants.95 Delays in designating facilities to receive defendants
determined to lack capacity as inpatients has not been the subject of
litigation in New York.96 However, in several other jurisdictions,
lawsuits alleging "violations of the rights of defendants with mental
illness to timely competency restoration have been" commenced.97
The ACLU of Pennsylvania recently announced a settlement with
93 Id. at S41-S43.
94 Shea, supra note 11, at 9.
95 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.50(1) (McKinney 2017); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §
7.09(c) (McKinney 2017).
- See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union-Pa., ACLU-PA Settles Lawsuit over
Unconstitutional Delays in Treatment for Hundreds of Defendants with Severe Mental





the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services that will bring
significant "changes to [the state's] under-[funded] forensic mental
health services."98
1. Section 730.20: Fitness to Proceed: Generally
Dusky v. United States articulated the standard to be applied in
determining whether a defendant has the capacity to stand trial is
whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and
whether [the defendant] has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him."99 The American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law made the following
observations about the Dusky standard:
Adjudicative competence hinges on a defendant's present
mental state, in contrast with other criminal forensic
assessments (e.g., assessments of criminal responsibility or
of competence to waive Miranda rights at the time of arrest),
which refer to past mental states. . . . The attention of the
courts (and, implicitly, the attention of the psychiatrist) is
directed to the defendant's "ability" to consult rationally with
an attorney, rather than the defendant's willingness to
consult rationally. The term "reasonable" connotes flexibility
in determining competence, while the phrase "rational as
well as factual understanding" requires the courts and
psychiatrists to consider broadly how the defendant exercises
his cognitive abilities.
Evaluating clinicians are given no guidance concerning
what level of capacity justifies a finding of competence. In
stating that the defendant must have "sufficient present
ability" to work with his attorney, the Court leaves it to the
trial court to decide, in a given case, whether a defendant's
abilities suffice for a finding of adjudicative competence.100
In New York, the mechanics involved in having a defendant
examined for the purpose of determining his or her capacity are set
9 Id. However, as noted by Fuller, lawsuits to remedy the rights of incapacitated
defendants to the rendition of appropriate mental health care has resulted in the diversion of
resources to treat civil patients. See FULLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 9. This is a dangerous
"shell game" that can and should be addressed by surveys to "determine how many
psychiatric beds are needed to meet inpatient need." See id. at 9, 29.
9 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 Mossman et al., supra note 26, at S5-S6.
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forth in Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") section 730.20.101 The
order of examination is usually directed to the local (county or city)
mental health director who must designate two qualified psychiatric
examiners to evaluate the defendant.102 The statute was amended
in 1989 to eliminate the requirement that psychiatrists be
designated to examine the defendant.103 Thus, examinations may
now be conducted by two psychiatrists, two psychologists, or one
from each discipline.10 4 Further:
[T]he examination may be conducted at the place the
defendant is held in custody, [which is typically a local
correctional facility,] or at a hospital. If the defendant is not
in custody, [the examination] may be conducted on an
outpatient basis. Significantly, unless the defendant has
been admitted to a hospital, these [psychiatric] examiners
... are either on the staff of, or retained by, the local (county
or city) department of mental health.10 5
2. Section 730.30: Fitness to Proceed: Order of Examination
A defendant is presumed competent to proceed and is not
entitled as a matter of right to have his or her mental
capacity determined by examination and hearing.
Entitlement to a hearing depends upon the court's
awareness of some basis for questioning the defendant's
capacity. This may appear from [the] defendant's prior
history combined with the circumstances of the crime
brought to the attention of the court by counsel; [or] it may
be apparent from the defendant's actions in the courtroom
that the court should initiate an inquiry into fitness sua
sponte. . . . The examination procedure may be initiated by
any court in which a criminal proceeding is pending and at
101 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.20 (McKinney 2017).
102 Id. § 730.20(1).
103 Assemb. B. 6997-A, 212th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1989) (enacted).
104 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.10(7).
105 Neil J. Rowe, Defense Practice Tips: Civil Alternatives for Disposing of Criminal
Proceedings of Defendants with Mental Disabilities, in 16 N.Y. STATE DEF. ASs'N, PUBLIC
DEFENSE BACKUP CENTER REPORT 11, 11 (July-Dec. 2001); see CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.20(2),
(3). Criminal defense attorneys need to be cognizant of the consequences of requesting an
article 730 examination. See BARRY KAMINS & WARREN J. MURRAY, LEXIsNEXIS
ANSWERGUIDE: NEWYORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ch. 2, pt. C, § 2.08.1 (Gary Laurie ed., 2017).
Ideally, in the case of a felony complaint, counsel should advocate for a reduction of the
charge to a misdemeanor or dismissal. See infra Part III(A)(4).
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any time from initial arraignment through sentencing.106
Subdivision 1 provides:
At any time after a defendant is arraigned upon an
accusatory instrument other than a felony complaint and
before the imposition of sentence, or at any time after a
defendant is arraigned upon a felony complaint and before
he is held for the action of the grand jury, the court wherein
the criminal action is pending must issue an order of
examination when it is of the opinion that the defendant
may be an incapacitated person.107
"Subdivisions two, three, and four set forth the rules governing
the action of the court after receipt of the examination reports."10 8
However, "[t]he question of whether a defendant is fit to proceed
calls for a judicial determination, not a medical one, and the court
need not accept the conclusions of the examiners irrespective of
whether they unanimously conclude that the defendant is or is not
an incapacitated person."109
Although the statute is silent regarding the burden and degree of
proof,1"0 "the Court of Appeals has [determined that] the burden
should be on the prosecution to prove competency by a
preponderance of the evidence.""'
Regardless, however, of the court's discretion to hold a
hearing, one is required if the examiners are not unanimous
in their opinions or if a hearing is requested by motion of
either the defendant or the [District Attorney]. . . . When a
defendant's capacity is in question, the burden is on the
[People] to establish that the defendant is fit to proceed by a
preponderance of the evidence and that the defendant is not
eligible for Jackson relief.112
106 Shea, supra note 11, at 9-10.
107 CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30(1).
10s Shea, supra note 11, at 10; see generally CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30(2)-(4) (stating what
the court should and must do when examining reports).
109 Shea, supra note 11, at 10; accord People v. Tortorici, 671 N.Y.S.2d 162, 164 (App. Div.
1998) (citing People v. Gensler, 527 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (N.Y. 1988)); cf. Mollen v. Matthews,
710 N.Y.S.2d 399 (App. Div. 2000).
10 See People v. Mendez, 801 N.E.2d 382, 384 (N.Y. 2003).
nI Peter Preiser, Practice Commentaries, in CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 730.30; Mendez, 801
N.E.2d at 384 (citing People v. Christopher, 482 N.E.2d 45, 49 (N.Y. 1985)).
112 Shea, supra note 11, at 10.
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3. Section 730.40: Fitness to Proceed: Local Criminal Court
Accusatory Instrument
If the examiners are of the opinion that the defendant is
incapacitated, the proceeding is founded on a local criminal
court accusatory instrument, and the charge is other than a
felony, a final order of observation must be issued. If the
charge is a felony, then a temporary order of observation is
issued, unless the District Attorney consents to a final order
being issued. [This s]ubdivision . . . prescribes that both the
final and the temporary order can require the defendant to
remain in the custody of OMH or OPWDD for a period not to
exceed 90 days. The statute also requires that the local
accusatory instrument be dismissed with prejudice when the
court issues a final order of observation. In [those] cases
where the court issues a temporary order of observation, the
felony complaint remains open for the duration of the order
... [and then] must be dismissed upon certification that the
defendant was in the custody of the Commissioner [at the
time the] order expired.113
In 1988, the Westchester County Supreme Court struck
down the automatic 90-day commitment [authorized by
section 730.40 as unconstitutional] in the case of Ritter v.
Surles. The state [officer defendants] elected not to appeal
the order entered in Ritter [and i]nstead, . . . instituted a
policy in [OMH] hospitals requiring a defendant to be
discharged within 72 hours following remand by the criminal
court unless the defendant meets the criteria for either a
voluntary or an involuntary admission to the hospital
pursuant to article 9 of the [Mental Hygiene Law
("MHL")] .114
In contrast, OPWDD did not immediately adopt any published
regulations or policies concerning the retention, care, and
11s While under a temporary order of observation, the defendant may still be indicted. See
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.40(4). If the defendant is indicted and arraigned, the temporary order
is extinguished at the end of the 90-day period. See id. § 730.40(1), (5). Any indictment must
be filed in a superior court within six months of the expiration of the 90-day period prescribed
in the temporary order. Id. If no indictment is filed, the Commissioner may either release
the defendant or convert the defendant to civil status if the defendant meets criteria for
admission under articles 9 or 15 of the Mental Hygiene Law. See Ritter v. Surles, 545
N.Y.S.2d 962, 965 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
114 Shea, supra note 11, at 10.
10552016/2017]
Albany Law Review
treatment of defendants remanded to the Commissioner's
custody pursuant to CPL section 730.40.115
Currently, the OPWDD Bureau of Institutional and Transitional
Services ("BITS") makes a placement recommendation for the
defendant.116 The defendant may be admitted to a developmental
center pursuant to article 15 of the MHL, 117 or referred for
admission to a less restrictive community placement.118 There is no
express statutory time period by which the Commissioner must
designate a facility for the defendant's further evaluation.119 Due
process considerations would seem to sanction a brief
administrative detention of no more than seventy-two hours
following the issuance of the final order of observation to determine
whether the defendant is in need of civil admission to a hospital or
developmental center.120 Such considerations are especially acute
for those criminal defendants who may have been subject to an
examination order conducted as an outpatient, and those who are
exposed to a return to criminal confinement following the dismissal
of criminal charges and the issuance of a final order of
observation.121
A defendant remanded for evaluation for admission
pursuant to [section] 730.40 will most likely be received at a
state-operated psychiatric hospital. However, a 2008
amendment to article 730 . . . permit[s] the admission of the
defendant to a private hospital licensed by OMH, provided
115 See id. at 10-11.
116 See New York State Office ofMental Health (OMH) Division of Forensic Services Bureau
of Institutional and Transitional Services (BITS), N.Y. ST. OFF. MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/forensic/bits/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2017) [hereinafter OMH-
BITS].
1 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 15.03 (McKinney 2017).
118 See OMH-BITS, supra note 116.
'1 See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.60(1) (McKinney 2017) (noting that the
statute is silent as to the time within which the Commissioner must designate an appropriate
institution to receive a defendant subject to a final order of observation).
120 Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2000) (first citing MENTAL HYG. LAW §
9.37(a); and then citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 15.7(a) (2017)).
121 A hypothetical case example illustrates the jeopardy faced by a defendant examined as
an outpatient: Defendant is charged with misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. Weeks
after the criminal charges are lodged, the defendant suffers a stroke that renders him
mentally incapable of assisting with his defense. He is placed in a nursing home. His defense
counsel requests an outpatient capacity evaluation pursuant to CPL section 730.20. The
examiners find the defendant unfit to proceed and a final order of evaluation is entered
dismissing the criminal charges. Despite the fact that the criminal charges are dismissed by
operation of CPL section 730.40, the statute would nonetheless authorize the defendant's
remand to a local jail pending a designation by the Commissioner for evaluation for
admission to a hospital. See infra Section III(A)(5) (discussing CPL section 730.60).
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the hospital agrees to receive the defendant. The
amendment offers flexibility to the Commissioner in
ascertaining the most appropriate treatment setting for the
defendant, but most likely the statutory change was driven
by the inordinately high cost of maintaining a person in a
state-operated psychiatric bed. Whatever the rationale, the
amendment furthers the right of the defendant o treatment
in the least restrictive environment consistent with public
safety and the defendant's [treatment] needs.
For those defendants who are committed to the custody of
the Commissioner of OMH pursuant to article 730, there is a
strict regulatory framework governing their care and
treatment while under an order of commitment from a
criminal court and the regulations apply even [if] the
patient[ is] convert[ed] to civil status. The(] regulations
require, in part, that before clinical discretion is exercised to
release, change status, or grant[ing] furloughs to a patient
remanded to OMH custody by a criminal court, there must
be a review of the decision by the hospital forensic
committee.122
For those defendants committed to the custody of OPWDD, similar
reviews are conducted, but there are no OPWDD-implementing
regulations parallel to those promulgated by OMH.123
4. Section 730.50: Fitness to Proceed: Indictment
Where the indictment charges a felony, a commitment order is
issued for a period of up to one year.124  "First [orders] and
subsequent orders of retention may be issued upon application by
the facility director" and following a hearing upon the court's
122 Shea, supra note 11, at 11-12. In Monaco v. Hogan (No. 98-CV-3386, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 131545 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010)) it was alleged, among other things, that the OMH
Commissioner violated the equal protection rights of defendants remanded to the
Commissioner's custody following the issuance of final orders of observation by treating the
defendants upon admission differently than other civil patients simply because they had been
charged with a crime. Under the terms of a 2013 settlement, "final order" patients who were
admitted to hospitals on civil status were subject to a formal or informal review by the
hospital forensic committee before being afforded privileges or discharge only if there was a
clinical basis for the heightened review. See Shea, supra note 11, at 12. The fact that the
patient had been charged with a crime was not, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for
heightened review of the patient's status. Id.
123 See COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 111.4 (providing OMH's implementation
regulations for incapacitated defendants, thus demonstrating that OPWDD does not have
implementation regulations).
124 See CRIM. PROC. IAW § 730.50(1).
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motion, or that of the defendant or the Mental Hygiene Legal
Service.125
An indicted incapacitated defendant may be held in the
custody of the Commissioner indefinitely without achieving
dismissal of the indictment, . . . so long as the aggregate
periods of retention prescribed in the temporary order of
commitment, the first order of retention, and any subsequent
order do not exceed two-thirds of the authorized maximum
term of imprisonment for the highest class of felony charged
in the indictment.126
Nationally, criminal defendants confined for restoration of
capacity are typically confined in the most restrictive, maximum
secure forensic hospitals operated by the state whether or not they
were arrested for violent crimes, pose a significant threat of danger
to the community, or are seriously mentally ill.127 This is, in fact,
the practice in New York State.128 There are four secure facilities in
New York operated by OMH that receive defendants upon orders of
criminal courts for competency restoration: Kirby Forensic
Psychiatric Center in New York County, Mid-Hudson Psychiatric
Center in Orange County, the Central New York Psychiatric Center
in Oneida County, and the Rochester Psychiatric Center in Monroe
County.129 For defendants committed to the custody of the OPWDD
Commissioner, defendants are received at either the Sunmount
Developmental Center in Franklin County or the Valley Ridge
125 Shea, supra note 11, at 12; accord CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.50(2), (3). The Mental
Hygiene Legal Service is an auxiliary agency of the Appellate Divisions of State Supreme
Court that operates pursuant to article 47 of the Mental Hygiene Law to provide legal
services and assistance to patients and residents of mental hygiene facilities. See Mental
Hygiene Legal Service: History and Purpose, SUP. CT. ST. N.Y., APP. DIVISION, FOURTH JUD.
DEP'T, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad4/mhls/mhls-index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
126 Shea, supra note 11, at 12; accord CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.50(3). New York is one of
thirty states that codified statutes specifying "a maximum period of commitment, either as a
certain number of years or as some proportion [for] the maximum prison sentence for the
crime charged." Joseph R. Simpson, When Restoration Fails: One State's Answer to the
Dilemma of Permanent Incompetence, 44 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 171, 172 (2016). Ten
states have no statutes that set the maximum period of retention and "[t]he remaining ...
states [permit] . . . indefinite commitment, but only so long as the defendant [meets] civil
commitment criteria." Id.
127 See Perlin, supra note 6, at 193 (observing that such practices may violate the
Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012)) as interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C. (527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999))).
128 See Perlin, supra note 6, at 207 n.97.
129 New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH): Division of Forensic Services: Forensic
Psychiatric Centers, N.Y. ST. OFF. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/
forensic/psychiatric centers.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
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Center for Intensive Treatment in Chenango County.130
Where a court finds that [the defendant has not made
actual progress towards recovering fitness to proceed and]
there is no substantial probability a defendant will attain
capacity in the foreseeable future, it may afford relief to the
defendant in the form of conversion to civil status without
dismissal of the indictment. Conversion to civil status
[often] has advantages for the defendant in terms of
obtaining increased privileges or possible release from the
hospital. As a result of the Court of Appeals decision in
People v Lewis, however, conversion to civil status [can] have
adverse consequences for the defendant [because] time in
custody on [a] civil status will not count toward the two-
thirds maximum and dismissal of the indictment.
Under CPL 730.50[,] an incapacitated defendant may [be]
subject[] to either inpatient or outpatient commitment, but
outpatient commitment may only be authorized by order of a
superior court with the consent of the District Attorney.
[Proposed as a budget bill, t]he 2012 amendment to the CPL
permitting outpatient commitment was supported by the
rationale that only 20% of defendants committed to OMH or
OPWDD custody for restoration of capacity are deemed to
otherwise be in need of hospitalization.1 3 1
With the 2012 chapter amendment to CPL 730,132 New York
130 See Provider Directory, OFF. FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DIsABILITIES,
https://providerdirectory.opwdd.ny.gov/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2017). In New York,
incapacitated defendants have established the right to treatment in the least restrictive
environment as a matter of due process of law. See Bernstein v. Pataki, 233 F. App'x 21, 25
(2d Cir. 2007); People ex rel. Jesse F. v. Bennett, 661 N.Y.S.2d 657, 659 (App. Div. 1997);
People v. Betances, 671 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933 (Sup. Ct. 1998). As originally enacted, CPL section
730.60(1) permitted the adjudication of defendants as "dangerous incapacitated person[s]."
See Laws of May 20, 1970, ch. 996 § 730.60(1), 1970 N.Y. Laws 3369. Subsequently, in Gomez
v. Miller, a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
determined that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Gomez v. Miller, 341 F. Supp. 323, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Thereafter, in 1974, the legislature
amended CPL sections 730.60(1) and 730.60(3) to eliminate the provisions that permitted the
adjudication of dangerous incapacitated persons. See Laws of May 30, 1974, ch. 629 § 730.60,
1974 N.Y. Laws 1670. Consequently, unlike CPL sections 330.20(1)(f), 330.20(6), and
330.20(14), there is no provision under CPL article 730 for adjudicating someone a
"dangerous incapacitated person." Compare CRIM. PROc. LAW § 330.20(1)(f), (6), (14), with
CRIM. PRoc. LAW art. 730. Nor is there any authority to require that a person committed
under article 730 be held at any particular facility or under any specific level of supervision.
See CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 330.20(12) (demonstrating that under this law, there are particular
facilities and levels of supervision for persons committed).
131 Shea, supra note 11, at 12-13.
132 Assemb. B. 9056-D, 235th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012) (enacted).
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joined the majority of other states that allow for outpatient
restoration of capacity.133 Outpatient restoration may offer the
most promise for individuals with:
[Developmental disabilities,] cognitive disorders[,] or
developmental disorders, or major mental illness, if all of the
following apply: (a) the community has a program to restore
competency that is suitable for the treatment needs of the
defendant; (b) the program provides intensive, individualized
competency training tailored to the demands of the case and
the defendant's particular competency deficits; (c) the
defendant has a stable living arrangement with individuals
who can assist with compliance with appointments and with
treatment; and (d) the defendant is compliant with
treatment, and not abusing alcohol or other chemical
substances.134
In New York, OMH has issued policy guidance on outpatient
restoration,135  although outpatient restoration remains an
underutilized remedy.136
5. Section 730.60: Fitness to Proceed: Procedure Following Custody
by the Commissioner
This section deals with the incidents of custody following
commitment under a CPL article 730 final or temporary order of
observation or an order of commitment. For mentally ill
defendants, once a local or superior court has issued an order under
this article, the OMH Division of Forensic Services or OPWDD
BITS committee is responsible for designating a facility to receive
the defendant.137  To repeat, the statute contains no temporal
limitation within which the Commissioner is required to designate a
facility to receive a defendant.138
The criminal proceeding is suspended while the defendant is
133 See Reena Kapoor, Jail-Based Competency Restoration, 39 J. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 311, 311 (2011).
134 Placement of Individuals found Incompetent to Stand Trial: A Review of Competency
Programs and Recommendations 25-26 (Disability Rights Cal., Paper. No. CM52.01, 2015).
135 OFF. OF MENTAL HEALTH, OMH GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF OUTPATIENT
COMPETENCY RESTORATION (OCR) 1 (2013).
136 See Ben Hattem, How New York's Mentally Ill Get Lost in Courts, Jails and Hospitals,
ALJAZEERA AM. (July 27, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/27/ny-mentally-
ill-get-lost-in-the-justice-system.html ("OMH has not made progress on implementing an
outpatient restoration program.").
137 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.60(1) (McKinney 2017).
11s See id.
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incapacitated. [Subdivision four of this section provides,
however, that n]otwithstanding the suspension of the
criminal action, the defendant may make any motion
appropriate to preserve his or her rights[,] which is
susceptible of fair determination without his or her personal
participation. This would, for instance, include a motion for
dismissal of the indictment based upon an error in its
procurement or filing. A defendant who has been in custody
for two or more years under a commitment order may also
move for dismissal of the indictment upon the consent of the
District Attorney and upon a finding that dismissal of the
indictment is consistent with the ends of justice and
continued custody under an order of commitment is not
necessary for the protection of the public or the treatment of
the defendant.
Subdivision six of this section [also contains] notice
requirements which provide, in essence, that any person
committed to the Commissioner's custody pursuant to any
section of article 730 may not be discharged, released on
condition or placed on any less restrictive status unless four
days' notice (excluding weekends and holidays) is provided to
law enforcement officials, including the District Attorney,
and any potential victim of an assault or other violent
felony.13 9
The statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person
committed to the custody of the Commissioner pursuant to
this article, or continuously thereafter retained in such
custody, shall be discharged, released on condition or placed
in any less secure facility or on any less restrictive status,
including, but not limited to vacations, furloughs and
temporary passes, unless the Commissioner or his or her
designee, which may include the director of an appropriate
institution, shall deliver written notice, at least four days,
excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, in advance of
the change of such committed person's facility or status, or in
the case of a person committed pursuant to a final order of
observation written notice upon discharge of such committed
139 Shea, supra note 11, at 13.
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person, to all of the following: (1) The District Attorney of the
county from which such person was committed. . . . 14 0
Article 730 does not require that judicial approval be obtained
before OMH or OPWDD afford furloughs to an incapacitated
defendant in custody pursuant to an order of observation, order of
commitment, or order of retention. 14 1  In limited, statutorily
prescribed circumstances, however, the District Attorney (among
others) is entitled to receive notice that an incapacitated defendant
may be afforded furloughs and may, in turn, in certain
circumstances, seek a hearing on the appropriateness of the grant of
furloughs.142 In this regard, CPL section 730.60(6)(c) provides:
Whenever a District Attorney has received the notice
described in this subdivision, and the defendant is in the
custody of the Commissioner pursuant to a final order of
observation or an order of commitment, he may apply within
three days of receipt of such notice to a superior court, for an
order directing a hearing to be held to determine whether
such committed person is a danger to himself or others.
Such hearing shall be held within ten days following the
issuance of such order. Such order may provide that there
shall be no further change in the committed person's facility
or status until the hearing. Upon a finding that the
committed person is a danger to himself or others, the court
shall issue an order to the Commissioner authorizing
retention of the committed person in the status existing at
the time notice was given hereunder, for a specified period,
not to exceed six months. The District Attorney and the
committed person's attorney shall be entitled to the
committed person's clinical records in the Commissioner's
custody, upon the issuance of an order directing a hearing to
be held.143
Subdivision six was added to CPL section 730.60 in 1980 as a
public safety measure.144 However, if defendants are not permitted
140 CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.60(6)(a)(1).
141 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 540.4 (2017) (noting that escorted furloughs are
limited to defendants subject to orders of retention); id. § 504.5 (noting that unescorted
furloughs are precluded for defendants retained under temporary orders of observation,
orders of commitment, or retention orders).
142 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.60(6)(c).
143 Id.
144 Laws of June 26, 1980, ch. 549 § 730.60, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1627-28. The chapter
amended was intended to provide notice to potential victims of persons committed under
article 730, and was enacted after the release of a psychiatric patient from the Pilgrim
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integrated community opportunities while confined for purposes of
restoration, their overall treatment progress may suffer.
14 5
Particularly in the case of developmentally disabled individuals
committed to the custody of OPWDD, closely supervised trips into
the community provide a therapeutic benefit to defendants by
enabling them to practice skills and implement strategies designed
to avoid the risk of problem behaviors.146  Restricting
developmentally disabled defendants to the facility without the
opportunity for community integration opportunities also implicates
federal Medicaid regulations,147 since the inpatient facilities
operated by OPWDD participate in the Medicaid program.148
Federal regulations provide that individuals who reside in
developmental centers must be afforded the "opportunity to
participate in social, religious, and community group activities."
149
One of the few reported cases offering a construction of CPL
section 730.60 is People v. Helfman.150 In Helfman, the defendant's
final order of observation had terminated and he was confined for a
period of thirty days from the expiration date of that order pursuant
to CPL section 730.70.151 In ruling that the People lacked standing
Psychiatric Center and the killing of his ex-wife in 1979. See James Barron, L.I. Mental
Patient Guilty of Killing Ex-Wife, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com
/1981/12/10/nyregion/li-mental-patient-guilty-of-killing-ex-wife.html.
145 See DIANA JONES RITTER ET AL., MOST INTEGRATED SETTING COORDINATING COUNCIL:
2008 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2008), https://opwdd.ny.gov/sites/default/files/documents/misce
annualreport.pdf.
146 See generally id. (indicating the effort being made to facilitate community integration).
147 The U.S. Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C. affirmed the responsibility by each state to
serve individuals with disabilities in the most integrated community settings appropriate to
meet the individual's specific needs. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999). In
reaction to this decision, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") issued
policy directives to the states on how best to comply with community integration, including
incentivizing the use of the § 1915(c) Home and Community Based Services
("HSBC") waiver. See OFFICE OF DISABILITY, ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., AGING AND LONG-TERM CARE POLICY: A
COMPENDIUM OF CURRENT FEDERAL INITIATIVES IN RESPONSE TO THE OLMSTEAD DECISION 3
(2001). Since this time, there have been additional steps taken by the federal government to
incentivize community integration of individuals with disabilities, including provisions in the
Affordable Care Act, which, among other things, extended the Money Follows the Person
("MFP") demonstration grant program and enhanced federal funding for community services
under new incentive programs, Community First Choice services, and Balancing Incentive
Programs ("BIP"). See Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2401, 124 Stat. 297-301
(2010); id. § 2403, 124 Stat. 304-305; id. § 10202, 124 Stat. 923-927.
148 Medicaid: Introduction, N.Y. ST. OFF. FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
https://opwdd.ny.gov/opwdd resourcesfbenefits information/medicaidlintroduction (last
visited July 3, 2017).
149 42 C.F.R. § 483.420(a)(11) (2017).
160 People v. Helfman, 458 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 1983).
161 See id. at 629.
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to request a hearing under CPL section 730.60(6)(c), the Appellate
Division, Second Department, held:
CPL 730.60 (subd 6, par [c]) provides that "[whenever] a
District Attorney has received the notice described in this
subdivision, and the defendant is in the custody of the
Commissioner pursuant to a final order of observation or an
order of commitment, he may apply within three days of
receipt of such notice to a superior court, for an order
directing a hearing to be held to determine whether such
committed person is a danger to himself or others. . . . Such
order may provide that there shall be no further change in
the committed person's facility or status until the hearing."
The final order of observation automatically terminated upon
expiration of a period of 90 days. Upon termination of such
an order, the superintendent of the institution in which the
incapacitated defendant is confined may retain him for care
and treatment for a period of 30 days from the expiration
date, pursuant to CPL 730.70. Alternatively, the
incapacitated defendant may be retained in the custody of
the Commissioner as a voluntary patient, an informal
patient or an involuntary patient pursuant to the Mental
Hygiene Law. At the time Creedmoor Psychiatric Center
notified the District Attorney of its intent to discharge
defendant he was no longer in custody pursuant to a final
order of observation. Apparently, defendant, upon
termination of the final order of observation, was retained in
the Commissioner's custody pursuant to CPL 730.70. Since
defendant was no longer in the Commissioner's custody
pursuant to a final order of observation, by the express terms
of CPL 730.60 (subd 6, par [c]) the District Attorney was not
entitled to a hearing.152
Thus, the statutory predicate for the District Attorney to request
a hearing is that the defendant is confined "pursuant to [either] a
final order of observation or an order of commitment."1 53 However,
the Queens County Supreme Court recently held otherwise.154 The
constitutionality of CPL section 730.60(6) as applied to final-order
defendants was challenged in Ritter v. Surles.155 According to the
152 Id. (internal citations omitted).
153 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.60(6)(c) (McKinney 2017).
im People v. Maignan, 39 N.Y.S.3d 859, 863 (Sup. Ct. 2016).
I15 Ritter v. Surles, 545 N.Y.S.2d 962, 962-63 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
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court's decision, the Commissioner may still notify parties of an
upcoming release or change in status, but the release may not be
delayed for the purpose of notification.15 6 The court also held that
the District Attorney no longer has criminal jurisdiction over the
"final-ordered" defendant since all criminal charges were
dismissed.157
6. Section 730.70: Fitness to Proceed: Procedure Following
Termination of Custody by the Commissioner
When a defendant is in the custody of the Commissioner
on the expiration date of a final or temporary order of
observation or an order of commitment, or on the expiration
date of the last order of retention, or on the date an order
dismissing an indictment is served upon the Commissioner,
the superintendent of the institution in which the defendant
is confined may retain him for care and treatment for a
period of thirty days from such date.1 58
If the director determines that the defendant remains in need of
inpatient care and treatment, he may, before the expiration of such
thirty-day period, apply for the defendant's retention as a civil
patient pursuant to articles 9 or 15 of the Mental Hygiene Law.1 59
IV. THE INSANITY DEFENSE
In contrast to mental capacity, "which is a prerequisite for a
defendant to stand trial, insanity is an affirmative defense that may
be raised during the trial."160 When invoking the insanity defense,
a "defendant admits to committing the offense but argues lack of
culpability due to his or her mental state at the time" of the
crime.16 1 While the test used to determine "insanity" varies among
jurisdictions, there are two dominant approaches.162 Under the
M'Naghten rule,163 the trier of fact must determine whether the
defendant could understand the difference between right and wrong
116 See id. at 966.
157 Id.
1- CRIM. PROC. LAw § 730.70.
159 See id.
160 Fatma Marouf, Assumed Sane, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 25, 29 (2016).
161 Id.
162 Randy Borum & Solomon M. Fulero, Empirical Research on the Insanity Defense and





and, if not, whether this was due to a mental disease or defect.164 A
less restrictive approach requires showing that the defendant
lacked sufficient capacity to appreciate the criminality of his acts, or
to conform his actions to the requirements of law, due to mental
disease or defect.165  Within each of these general approaches,
variations exist among states.166 The burden of proof also varies,
with some states placing the burden on the People to demonstrate
that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense and others
requiring the defendant to prove insanity at the time of the
offense.167
There are risks associated with the insanity defense.168 Studies
have revealed "that the insanity defense is [invoked] in only 1% of
felony cases, and, when raised, it is rarely successful."169 While
empirical research varies widely, some studies demonstrate that the
"defense succeeds in [only] one out of four cases, while others have
found a success rate as low as one in a thousand."170 The overall
low success rate may itself be a deterrent to making the defense,
but there are other reasons to avoid it as well. Specifically:
Defendants whose insanity defenses are
unsuccessful-which represents the vast majority of those
who raise it-receive significantly longer sentences than
those who are convicted without having argued insanity. In
other words, defendants pay a penalty for arguing insanity
and losing.171  Furthermore, in many states, defendants
164 See id.
166 See id.
166 See id. at 118.
167 See id. at 123.
- See Marouf, supra note 160, at 29-31.
169 Id. at 30; see Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity
Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 334-35
(1991); see also Bonita M. Veysey, Gender Role Incongruence and the Adjudication of
Criminal Responsibility, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2015) ("Even though the actual numbers
are quite small, the American public and attorneys alike believe that the defense is invoked
frequently and principally in cases involving murder. Despite these perceptions, most cases
that involve an insanity plea are not for murder charges and are cases in which the evidence
of mental illness is so overwhelming that the prosecution does not contest the insanity plea.").
170 Marouf, supra note 160, at 30; accord Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond
Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7, 11-12 (2007) (citing a success rate of under twenty-five percent);
Heather Leigh Stangle, Note, Murderous Madonna: Femininity, Violence, and the Myth of
Postpartum Mental Disorder in Cases of Maternal Infanticide and Filicide, 50 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 699, 728 (2008) (citing a success rate of one in one thousand criminal trials); Stephen G.
Valdes, Comment, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of Criminal Law Defenses,
Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea Negotiations, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1709,
1723 (2005) (citing success rates ranging from 0.87% to 26%).
171 In addition, several states-Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Kansas-do not recognize the
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acquitted based on insanity often experience longer periods
of civil commitment than the maximum length of time in
prison that a defendant could have served for the crime.
172
Thus, there are entrenched incentives for defendants to plead guilty
even if they have a viable insanity defense.
The insanity defense in New York is codified at Penal Law section
40.15:
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense
that when the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct,
he lacked criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease
or defect. Such lack of criminal responsibility means that at
the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or
defect, he lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate
either: (1) The nature and consequences of such conduct; or
(2) [t]hat such conduct was wrong.173
Because the defense of "not responsible by reason of mental
disease or defect" is an affirmative defense, a defendant who raises
the issue bears the burden of proof under a preponderance of the
evidence standard.1 74 The defendant must serve notice of his or her
intent to present psychiatric evidence before the trial and within
thirty days after a plea of not guilty to the indictment.1 7 5 "In the
interest of justice and for good cause," the filing of such a notice may
"be made at any . . . time prior to the close of . .. evidence."176 If the
defendant provides such notice, he or she must submit to an
examination by the People's psychiatrist.1 77  The defendant's
attorney and the District Attorney have a right to observe the
examination.1 78 If the defendant refuses to cooperate with the
District Attorney's examination, the court may preclude
introduction of evidence of mental disease or defect by the
defendant's expert witnesses.179 Statements made by a defendant
during an examination by the prosecution are admissible only as to
issues raised by the affirmative defense.180 Psychiatric evidence can
insanity defense, and the Supreme Court has never addressed whether the defense is
constitutionally required. See Marouf, supra note 160, at 32.
172 Id. at 30.
173 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 2017).
174 See id. § 25.00(2).
175 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.10(2) (McKinney 2017).
176 Id.
177 Id. § 250.10(3).
178 Id.
179 Id. § 250.10(5).
180 See, e.g., Lee v. Cty. Court of Erie Cty., 267 N.E.2d 452, 457 (N.Y. 1971) ("A defendant's
waiver of privilege because of his plea of insanity only permits the physician to testify as to
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be presented by a psychologist1 8 1 or a clinical social worker.182 Upon
entry of a judgment of "not responsible," a defendant becomes
subject to the post-verdict or plea provisions of CPL section
330.20.183
B. The Disposition of Defendants Found Not Responsible by Reason
of Mental Disease or Defect
"[A] seemingly unresolvable paradox. "'m
The retention, care, treatment, and release of persons found not
responsible of crimes after successfully invoking the insanity
defense is a complex process "involving the balancing of ...
individual liberties and the protection of society."185 Critical to
understanding New York's post-verdict procedures is familiarity
with the seminal case of In re Torsney.186 In 1976, Robert Torsney,
an on-duty New York City police officer shot and killed a black
youth and was subsequently indicted for and charged with second
degree murder.1 8 7 Evidence demonstrated that Torsney fired his
weapon without provocation or justification at point-blank range.188
The defendant admitted the killing, but contended that he was not
criminally responsible, due to a mental disease or defect diagnosed
as psychomotor epilepsy.189 There was competing expert testimony
from both the prosecution and the defense,190 and the jury returned
the facts which formulate the basis of his medical opinion on the question of sanity.... [T]he
District Attorney [shall not] be permitted to use the psychiatric examination as a source of
evidence which would be relevant on the issue of guilt.").
181 Cf. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.10(5) ("[The court] may preclude introduction of testimony
by a psychiatrist or psychologist concerning mental disease or defect of the defendant at
trial.").
182 See People v. Scala, 491 N.Y.S.2d 555, 563 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
-s See CRIM. PROc. LAW § 330.20 (providing the section or the CPL that is applicable to a
verdict or plea of not responsible).
-" See Warren J. Ingber, Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class: The Commitment and
Release of Persons Acquitted of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281,
281 (1982).
188 Barbara E. McDermott et al., The Conditional Release of Insanity Acquittees: Three
Decades of Decision-Making, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 329, 329 (2008).
186 In re Torsney, 394 N.E.2d 262 (N.Y. 1979), distinguished by People v. Escobar, 462
N.E.2d 1171 (N.Y. 1984).
187 See In re Torsney, 394 N.E.2d at 263.
188 See id. at 273 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 263, 265. At the time of Torsney's case, insanity was a simple defense rather
than an affirmative defense; therefore, his acquittal reflected that the People failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sane at the time of the offense. Id. at 265.
190 See WILLIAM J. WINSLADE & JUDITH WILSON Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA 136 (1983).
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a verdict finding Torsney not guilty by reason of insanity.191
Torsney was committed to a secure psychiatric evaluation center
after his acquittal and then transferred to a non-secure hospital for
diagnosis and treatment.192  Within four months, the treating
physicians found that Torsney was not dangerous and not mentally
ill and recommended that he be released.19 3 After a series of
reviews by a special release committee, an independent review
panel, and the Commissioner of Mental Health, and following an
evidentiary hearing that continued for nine days, the trial court
ordered Torsney released on the conditions that he not carry a gun,
not continue as a police officer, and continue treatment as an
out-patient.194 The Appellate Division, Second Department,
reversed the release order, finding that the evidence failed to
establish that Torsney was appropriate for conditional release
without danger to himself or others.195 In a split decision, the Court
of Appeals reinstated the trial court's conditional release order,
concluding that Torsney was no longer suffering from a mental
disease or defect and was not a danger to himself or others.
196
The majority and dissent in Torsney disagreed as to the proper
construction of the CPL, which at the time provided:
If the court is satisfied that the committed person may be
discharged or released on condition without danger to
himself or others, the court must order his discharge, or his
release on such conditions as the court determines to be
necessary. If the court is not so satisfied, it must promptly
order a hearing to determine whether such person may
safely be discharged or released.197
A plurality of the court determined that to be constitutional,
current dangerousness had to be "causally connected to an
identifiable mental disease or defect" at risk of transforming the
hospital into a penitentiary.198 The three-judge dissent would have
191 In re Torsney, 412 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 394 N.E.2d 262 (N.Y.
1979). The verdict was met with criticism from the public, which saw implicit overtones of
racial bias in the killing and the acquittal. See WINSLADE & ROSS, supra note 190, at 136.
192 See WINSLADE & ROSs, supra note 190, at 143.
193 In re Torsney, 394 N.E.2d at 263 ("Torsney was transferred to Creedmoor Psychiatric
Center on March 3, 1978. . . . [Four months later,] on July 20, 1978, pursuant to CPL
330.20 (subd 2), the Commissioner petitioned the committing court for an order discharging
Torsney from his custody.").
194 See id. at 263-64.
195 In re Torsney, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22.
19 See In re Torsney, 394 N.E.2d at 262, 272.
197 Laws of June 23, 1976, § 330.20(3), 1976 N.Y. Laws 1-182.
19s See In re Torsney, 394 N.E.2d at 267, 274.
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held the detention of a person committed to a psychiatric facility
following an insanity plea permissible until so long as the person
proved that he no longer suffered from the symptoms that made
him dangerous.199
The majority held that the "automatic commitment of persons
acquitted of crimes by reason of mental disease or defect is
constitutionally permissible only for a reasonable period of time-
that is, sufficient time to permit an examination and report as to
the detainee's sanity."200 To support continued retention, the Court
of Appeals required a finding that the patient was mentally ill and
in need of inpatient treatment.201 A dangerous propensity, by itself,
was not sufficient.202
In New York, the current procedures for the retention, care, and
treatment of persons found not responsible by reason of mental
disease or defect, were enacted in 1980.203 The current statute was
designed to comply with the constitutional mandates of Torsney and
followed a study conducted by the New York State Law Revision
Commission.204 The detailed statutory scheme, codified at CPL
section 330.20, was intended to mirror the Mental Hygiene Law, but
created "new procedures for aspects of post-verdict supervision"
applicable only to defendants found not responsible by reason of
mental disease or defect.205
1. Examination Order
Following an insanity verdict or plea, the trial judge must
immediately order a psychiatric examination of the defendant, to be
followed by an initial hearing to determine the defendant's current
mental state.206 The examination usually takes place in a secure
facility for a period not exceeding thirty days, subject to extension
199 See id. at 274-75. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently held in 1983 that "[t]he
committed [insanity] acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no
longer dangerous." See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1982); see also Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85-86 (1992) (stating that neither a showing of mental illness nor
dangerousness alone will satisfy the requirements of due process when an individual's liberty
is at stake).
2- In re Torsney, 394 N.E.2d at 264.
201 See id. at 266.
202 Id.
203 1980 N.Y. Sess. Laws 941, 945 (McKinney).
204 Report of the Law Revision Commission: The Defense of Insanity in New York State, in
1981 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2251, 2253, 2264-65 (McKinney) [hereinafter Report of the Law
Revision Commission].
205 In re Norman D., 818 N.E.2d 642, 644 (N.Y. 2004).
20s N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(2), (6) (McKinney 2017).
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upon application by the Commissioner to the court.207 At least two
qualified psychiatric examiners must examine the defendant and
prepare reports for submission: in the first instance, to the
Commissioner, and then to the judge.208
2. The Initial Hearing, Commitment Orders, and Orders of
Condition
Within ten days after receipt of the examination reports, the trial
judge must conduct an initial hearing.209 The initial hearing is a
critical stage of the proceeding because the court will determine "the
level of judicial and prosecutorial involvement in future decisions"
concerning the defendant's confinement, transfer, and release.2 10
"Based on its findings, [at the initial hearing,] the court then
assigns the [defendant] to one of the three tracks."2 11 Track-one
defendants are those found by the trial judge to suffer from a
dangerous mental disorder; i.e., a mental illness that makes them
"a physical danger to [themselves] or others."212  Track-two
defendants are mentally ill, but not dangerous,213 while track-three
defendants are neither dangerous nor mentally ill.214
"Track status, as determined by the initial commitment order,
governs the [defendant's] level of supervision in future proceedings
and may be overturned only on appeal from that order, not by
means of a rehearing and review."215 The trial judge must issue a
commitment order consigning track-one defendants "to the custody
of the Commissioner for confinement in a secure facility for care and
treatment for six months."2 16 Track-two defendants are ordered into
- Id. § 330.20(4).
20s See id. § 330.20(2), (5), (15).
209 Id. § 330.20(6).
210 In re Brian HH., 833 N.Y.S.2d 718, 720 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting In re Norman D., 818
N.E.2d at 644).
211 In re Norman D., 818 N.E.2d at 644. The "track" nomenclature does not appear in CPL
section 330.20, but is derived from the Law Revision Commission report that accompanied
the proposed legislation, which states: "The post-verdict scheme of proposed CPL 330.20
provides for three alternative 'tracks' based upon the court's determination of the defendant's
mental condition at the time of [the initial] hearing." Report of the Law Revision Commission,
supra note 204, at 2265.
212 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(1)(c), (6); Report of the Law Revision Commission, supra
note 204, at 2265-66.
213 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(1)(d), (6), (7); Report of the Law Revision Commission,
supra note 204, at 2265-66.
214 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(7); Report of the Law Revision Commission, supra note
204, at 2265-66.
215 See In re Norman D., 818 N.E.2d at 643.
216 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(1)(f), (6); Report of the Law Revision Commission, supra
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the Commissioner's custody for detention in a non-secure (civil)
facility, subject to an order of conditions.217 The order committing a
track-two defendant is deemed made pursuant to the Mental
Hygiene Law rather than CPL section 330.20; concomitantly,
subsequent proceedings regarding retention, conditional release, or
discharge of a track-two defendant are generally governed by
articles 9 (mentally ill) or 15 (developmentally disabled) of the
Mental Hygiene Law.2 18
Track-three defendants are discharged either unconditionally or,
in the judge's discretion, with an order of conditions.219 An order of
conditions is "an order directing a defendant to comply with [the]
prescribed treatment plan, or any other condition which the court
determines to be reasonably necessary or appropriate, and, in
addition, where a defendant is in custody of the Commissioner, not
to leave the facility without authorization."220 Such orders are valid
for five years and may be extended indefinitely upon a mere finding
of "good cause shown."2 2 1
As observed by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Norman D.,
"track-one status is significantly more restrictive than track-two
status."222 With a track-one designation, a defendant:
[I]s subject to ongoing supervisory terms of court-issued
commitment orders and subsequent retention orders; he . . .
must be confined to a secure psychiatric facility for an initial
period of six months; a court order is required for any
transfer to a non-secure facility, off-ground furlough, release
or discharge; and the District Attorney's office continues to
be notified of, with the option of participating in, further
court proceedings involving [the defendant's retention, care
note 204, at 2265-66.
217 See CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 330.20(1)(o), (7); Report of the Law Revision Commission, supra
note 204, at 2265-66.
21s See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(7); In re Jill ZZ., 629 N.E.2d 1040, 1042 (N.Y. 1994);
People v. Flockhart, 465 N.Y.S.2d 601, 602 (App. Div. 1983). Notwithstanding the statutory
requirement that the "conditional release or discharge" of the track-two defendant must be in
accordance with the provisions of the Mental Hygiene Law, the Court of Appeals held in In re
Jill ZZ. that the conditional release of the track-two defendant must be subject to a Criminal
Procedure Law order of conditions. See In re Jill ZZ., 629 N.E.2d at 1043 (quoting CRIM.
PROC. LAw § 330.20(7)).
219 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(6), (7), (8), (12). A discharge order is defined as "an order
terminating an order of conditions or unconditionally discharging a defendant from
supervision under the provisions of . .. section [330.20]." Id. § 330.20(1)(n).
220 Id. § 330.20(1)(o).
221 See id.; In re Oswald N., 661 N.E.2d 679, 681-82 (N.Y. 1995).
222 In re Norman D., 818 N.E.2d 642, 645 (N.Y. 2004).
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and treatment].223
The terms "dangerous mental disorder" and "mentally ill" are
terms of art under CPL article 330:
(c) "Dangerous mental disorder" means: (i) that a defendant
currently suffers from a "mental illness" as that term is
defined in subdivision twenty of section 1.03 of the mental
hygiene law,2 2 4 and (ii) that because of such condition he
currently constitutes a physical danger to himself or others.
(d) "Mentally ill" means that a defendant currently suffers
from a mental illness for which care and treatment as a
patient, in the in-patient services of a psychiatric center
under the jurisdiction of the state office of mental health, is
essential to such defendant's welfare and that his judgment
is so impaired that he is unable to understand the need for
such care and treatment; and, where a defendant is mentally
retarded, the term "mentally ill" shall also mean, for
purposes of this section, that the defendant is in need of care
and treatment as a resident in the in-patient services of a
developmental center or other residential facility for the
mentally retarded and developmentally disabled under the
jurisdiction of the state office of mental retardation and
developmental disabilities.225
In March 1995, the Court of Appeals issued its seminal decision
223 Id. at 644 (citing CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(6), (8)-(13)). In New York State, the OMH
operates two hospitals that are designated as secure facilities: Mid-Hudson Psychiatric
Center and Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center. See Donna L. Hall, New York State Office of
Mental Health Division of Forensic Services, OFF. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.omh.ny.gov
/omhweb/forensic/BFS.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2017). The Rochester Regional Forensic Unit
at Rochester Psychiatric Center is also a designated secure unit. Id. The OPWDD operates
two secure facilities for defendants found not responsible whose underlying conditions are
attributable to intellectual or other developmental disabilities. See ELLEN N. BIBEN & ROGER
BEARDEN, JOINT REPORT OF INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AND REVIEWS OF
CONDITIONS AT THE OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES' VALLEY RIDGE
CENTER FOR INTENSIVE TREATMENT 3-4 (2011), https://www.justicecenter.ny.gov/sites/default
/files/archivereports/Publications/CQC123011.pdf. Those units are located at the Sunmount
Developmental Center in Franklin County and the Valley Ridge Center for Intensive
Treatment in Chenango County. See id.; Jeff Platsky, Broome Developmental Center Closing
its Doors, PRESS & SUN BULL. (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.pressconnects.com/story/news
/local/2016/03/28/broome-developmental-center-closing-its-doors/82338564/.
224 CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 330.20(1)(c). MHL section 1.03(20) defines "mental illness" as: "[A]n
affliction with a mental disease or mental condition which is manifested by a disorder or
disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment to such an extent that the person
afflicted requires care, treatment and rehabilitation." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03(20)
(McKinney 2017).
225 CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(1)(c), (d).
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in In re George L.,226 construing what it means to currently suffer
from a "dangerous mental disorder."227 George L. was acquitted of
attempted murder, assault, and reckless endangerment charges and
committed to Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center.228 At his initial
hearing, three psychiatrists testified, all of them agreeing that he
suffered from acute paranoid schizophrenia, which was in remission
as long as he took his medication.229 Two of the doctors opined that
George L. did not have a dangerous mental disorder, but was
"mentally ill" and could be safely confined in a non-secure
hospital.230 The opinion of the People's witness as to the defendant's
prognosis was "considerably less sanguine" and testified that there
was a high probability of relapse for people diagnosed with
schizophrenia, as was George L. 2 31
The trial court found the defendant to have a dangerous mental
disorder even though he was not "specifically dangerous" at the time
of the initial hearing, resulting in a track-one disposition.232 The
Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed.233 On George L.'s
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the high court declined to adopt the
defendant's construction of the word "current" and instead held that
CPL section 330.20 "does not constrain a court to determining
dangerousness as of the moment in time" when the hearing is
conducted.234  Borrowing upon its foundational precedent in
Torsney, the Court of Appeals in George L. held that the state was
permitted to engage in a presumption that the causative mental
illness continues beyond the date of the criminal conduct.235
Additionally, the court stated:
Of course, a finding that a defendant "currently constitutes a
physical danger to himself or others" must be based on more
than expert speculation that he or she poses a risk of relapse
or reverting to violent behavior once medical treatment and
226 In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475 (N.Y. 1995).
227 See id. at 478.
228 Id. at 476.
229 Id. at 477.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 477-78. Specifically, the trial court found that the People sustained their burden
of the danger of relapse "at any time" and because there was a short time between the
commission of the acts which led to the indictment and initial hearing providing in the court's
view, "an insufficient basis upon which to make a determination as to petitioner's long-term
stability for purposes of transfer to a non-secure facility." Id.
233 In re George L., 612 N.Y.S.2d 945, 946 (App. Div. 1994).
234 In re George L., 648 N.E.2d at 479-80.
235 See id. at 480.
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supervision are discontinued. The prosecution may meet its
burden of proving that a defendant poses a current threat to
himself or others warranting confinement in a secure
environment, for example, by presenting proof of a history of
prior relapses into violent behavior, substance abuse or
dangerous activities upon release or termination of
psychiatric treatment, or upon evidence establishing that
continued medication is necessary to control defendant's
violent tendencies and that defendant is likely not to comply
with prescribed medication because of a prior history of such
noncompliance or because of threats of future
noncompliance. Dependence upon factors such as these-
clearly evidencing a defendant's threat to himself or
society-is warranted to justify the significant limitations on
an insanity acquittee's liberty interest [that] accompany
secure confinement.236
Thus, the George L. decision adopted a presumption that the
mental illness that led to the criminal act continues after the plea or
verdict of not responsible "and that . . . assessments [of
dangerousness] should not be limited to a point in time but rather
should be contextual and prospective in nature."237 Under New
York jurisprudence, the presumption of dangerousness continues, in
fact, and is not extinguished by a subsequent finding that the
defendant no longer suffers from a dangerous mental disorder.238
3. First and Subsequent Retention Hearings: Retention Orders,
Transfer Orders, and Release Orders
At least thirty days before a track-one defendant's initial
six-month commitment period lapses, the Commissioner must apply
to the trial judge, or a superior court in the county where the
defendant is securely housed, for a first retention order or a release
236 Id. at 481. Although the statute is silent as to the quantum of proof needed to satisfy
the court in a commitment proceeding, the Court of Appeals held in People v. Escobar that
preponderance of the evidence is the applicable standard of proof. People v. Escobar, 462
N.E.2d 1171, 1174, 1175 (N.Y. 1984).
237 Miraglia & Hall, supra note 71, at 526.
238 See Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). The Second Circuit observed
that a track-two defendant's equal protection argument-that following his release, he could
not be recommitted to a secure hospital under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Law-had "considerable force," but denied habeas relief because of the restricted scope of
review imposed on federal courts. See id. at 113, 117. The defendant's claim was premised
upon two prior explicit state court findings that he did not suffer from a dangerous mental
disorder. See id. at 103.
1075
Albany Law Review
order.239  The Commissioner must give written notice of this
application to the District Attorney, the defendant, his counsel, and
the Mental Hygiene Legal Service.240  Upon receipt of the
application, the judge on his own motion may, or upon timely
demand by one of those individuals or entities receiving notice
must, conduct a hearing.241 If the judge finds that the track-one
defendant still suffers from a dangerous mental disorder, she must
issue a first retention order, authorizing secure confinement for
another year, and thereafter (before expiration of the first, second,
and any subsequent retention orders, and assuming the defendant's
dangerous mental disorder persists), for succeeding periods of up to
two years.2 42  Alternatively, if the judge finds during a first or
subsequent retention proceeding that a track-one defendant is
mentally ill but no longer suffers from a dangerous mental disorder,
she must issue a retention order along with a transfer order and an
order of conditions.243
In the event that the judge finds that the defendant no longer
suffers from "a dangerous mental disorder and is not mentally ill,
[he or she] must issue a release order and an order of conditions."244
A transfer order directs the Commissioner to move the defendant
from secure to non-secure confinement.245 A release order "direct[s]
the Commissioner to terminate [the] defendant's in-patient status
without [ending his] responsibility for the defendant."246 When a
defendant is in the Commissioner's custody before expiration of the
period prescribed in a first, second, or subsequent retention order,
the same procedures govern application for issuance of any
subsequent retention order.247
4. Transfer Orders
At any time while the track-one defendant is in the
Commissioner's custody pursuant to a retention or recommitment
order, the Commissioner may apply to the court that issued the
order then in effect, or to a superior court in the county where the
239 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(8) (McKinney 2017).
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. § 330.20(1)(g)-(i); (8), (9).
243 Id. § 330.20(8), (9), (11).
24 Id. § 330.20(8), (9), (12).
245 Id. § 330.20(1)(1).
246 Id. § 330.20(1)(m).
247 See id. § 330.20(8), (9).
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defendant is securely housed, for a transfer order if, in his view, the
defendant no longer suffers from a dangerous mental disorder, or,
"consistent with the public safety and welfare of the community and
the defendant, the [defendant's] clinical condition . . . warrants" the
lesser level of confinement.248 "The Commissioner must give ten
days['] written notice [of this application] to the District Attorney,
the defendant, [his] counsel . . . and the Mental Hygiene Legal
Service."249 "Upon receipt of [the] application, the [judge] . . on
[his] own motion" may, or upon demand by the District Attorney
must, conduct a hearing on the application.250 He must grant the
application and issue the transfer order, along with an order of
conditions, if he finds that the defendant does not suffer from a
dangerous mental disorder, or that the defendant's transfer from
secure to non-secure detention is consistent with the public safety
and welfare of the community and the defendant, and is warranted
by the defendant's clinical condition.251
If the District Attorney does oppose the transfer, he or she "must
establish to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant has a
dangerous mental disorder or that the issuance of a transfer order
is inconsistent with the public safety and welfare of the
community."252 In In re Arto ZZ.,253 the Appellate Division, Third
Department, considered the People's appeal from a transfer order
for a defendant with developmental disabilities. The appellate court
affirmed the order on the strength of the testimony of the
Commissioner's expert witness, who opined that respondent had
made "steady therapeutic progress" and "transfer to a non-secure
facility was the appropriate next step in [the defendant's]
treatment."254 Placing reliance on evidence of past relapses, the
District Attorney sought to demonstrate that the defendant was
currently dangerous.255 The Third Department rejected this line of
reasoning, noting that the defendant's last relapse had been a
decade before the filing of the application for a transfer order and
that deference would be afforded to the trial court's assessment of
the expert opinion.256 Individuals who are subject to CPL section





253 In re Arto ZZ., 806 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (App. Div. 2005).
254 Id. at 259-60.
255 See id. at 259.
256 See id. at 259-60.
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330.20 are not permitted to initiate applications for transfer to non-
secure confinement, or for that matter, for furloughs or release.257
However, a writ of habeas corpus is an available remedy for a
person subject to the statute, who seeks to be transferred from
secure to non-secure confinement upon the grounds that she no
longer suffers from a dangerous mental disorder, but is mentally ill,
or for a person who maintains that she is suitable for release.258
As the discussion of the statutory framework for the retention
and transfer of track-one defendants reveals, the statute
contemplates a "step-down" or staged system of confinement where
individuals move from secure to non-secure confinement and
ultimately conditional release upon improvement in mental
status.259 In In re David B.,2 6 0 the Court of Appeals addressed the
"showing of dangerousness required to retain an insanity acquittee
in a non-secure psychiatric facility pursuant to [the] Criminal
Procedure Law." 2 6 1 Interpretation was required, in part, because on
its face, the statutory definition of "mentally ill"262 does not include
an element of dangerousness and elements of dangerousness are
required elements of any commitment or retention of an insanity
acquittee.263 The parties to the proceeding agreed that "there is a
constitutionally required minimum level of dangerousness to oneself
or others that must be [demonstrated] before an insanity acquittee
may be retained in a non-secure facility." 2 6 4 The issue for the Court
of Appeals was to determine the level of dangerousness that would
suffice to permit the state to retain the acquittee in custody and
whether the lower courts applied the proper standard.265
Borrowing from its prior precedent in George L., the Court of
Appeals held that "dangerousness may be supported by evidence of
violence, [but that] dangerousness is not coterminous with
violence."266 Further, the court stated:
257 See Henry 00. v. Main, 763 N.Y.S.2d 154, 156 (App. Div. 2003).
268 McGraw v. Wack, 632 N.Y.S.2d 135, 137 (App. Div. 1995).
259 See In re Jamie R. v. Consilvio, 844 N.E.2d 285, 287-88 (N.Y. 2006).
260 In re David B., 766 N.E.2d 565 (N.Y. 2002).
261 In re David B., 766 N.E.2d at 567.
262 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 330.20(1)(d) (McKinney 2017).
263 See In re David B., 766 N.E.2d at 571 n.5; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81
(1992) (distinguishing Louisiana's statute from the U.S. Supreme Court case of Salerno,
where a showing of dangerousness was necessary for confinement); Jones v. United States,
463 U.S. 354, 363-64 (1983) (indicating a need to show dangerousness to justify
commitment).
264 In re David B., 766 N.E.2d at 570.
265 Id. at 567, 571.
266 Id. at 571, 572.
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Apart from evidence of violence, [however,] retention of an
insanity acquittee in a non-secure facility is justified where
the state shows by a preponderance of the evidence that
continued care and treatment are essential to the physical or
psychological welfare of the individual and that the
individual is unable to understand the need for such care
and treatment. Retention also may be supported by the need
to prepare for a safe and stable transition from non-secure
commitment to release. Thus, in addition to recent acts of
violence and the risk of harm to the defendant or others that
would be occasioned by release from confinement, a court
may consider the nature of the conduct that resulted in the
initial commitment, the likelihood of relapse or a cure,
history of substance or alcohol abuse, the effects of
medication, the likelihood that the patient will discontinue
medication without supervision, the length of confinement
and treatment, the lapse of time since the underlying
criminal acts and any other relevant factors that form a part
of an insanity acquittee's psychological profile. While these
determinations include many of the same factors we
identified as relevant in George L., they need not be as
pronounced in the case of retention in a non-secure
facility. 267
Because the lower courts may have precluded evidence related to
dangerousness, the cases of In re David B. and In re Richard S.268
were remanded to permit findings to be made or, as the trial judge
deemed appropriate, to "allow additional relevant evidence" to be
introduced.269 In In re Richard S., on remand in 2003, the trial
court found that Richard S. was mentally ill and dangerous and
required confinement in a non-secure facility. 270 The Appellate
Division affirmed, concluding that Richard S. "meets all the criteria
for retention in a non-secure facility." 271 It found that the lower
court's findings of mental illness and dangerousness were supported
by a "strong preponderance of the credible evidence," and that the
lower court implicitly concluded that Richard S. was "not cured,
[and that] treatment [was] essential for his psychological welfare
and the safety of others, and he [was] unable to comprehend the
267 Id. at 572-73 (internal citation omitted).
268 In re Richard S., 776 N.Y.S.2d 604 (App. Div. 2004).
269 In re David B., 766 N.E.2d at 573.
270 In re Richard S., 776 N.Y.S.2d at 604, 607.
271 Id. at 607.
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need for such treatment."272 It rejected as "without merit" Richard
S.'s contention that his continued confinement was improper absent
a showing of "volitional impairment" or difficulty controlling his
behavior.273 The Court of Appeals dismissed Richard S.'s appeal of
that decision.274
Richard S. then filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of New York challenging, among
other things, the state's failure to apply the Supreme Court's
holding in Kansas v. Crane275 to his case.2 7 6 In addition, he argued
that he had established by clear and convincing evidence that he did
not have serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.277 The writ
was denied by the District Court, but an appeal ensued to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.278 As a threshold matter,
the Second Circuit disposed of the state's contention that Kansas v.
Crane did not govern the due process standards for insanity
acquittees.279
The Second Circuit held that Crane and Kansas v. Hendricks280
"rephrased the general constitutional standard for civil commitment
of insanity acquittees and other candidates for civil commitment to
clarify that proof of mental illness embrace[d] proof of a mental
[disorder] that makes it difficult to control one's dangerous
behavior."281 Further, the Second Circuit determined that there
would be "no justification for the contention that the Supreme Court
meant this standard to apply only to convicted sex offenders, given
the broad coverage of the Kansas Act and the context of the Court's
discussion."282
To the extent that Richard S. maintained that Crane required a
specific finding with respect to lack of control, the Second Circuit
did not find support for that proposition in the controlling Supreme
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 In re Richard S., 818 N.E.2d 668 (N.Y. 2004).
275 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). The U.S. Supreme Court held in Kansas v.
Crane "that there must be proof of serious difficulty ... controlling behavior" in order to
authorize the commitment of a sexually violent predator. Id. at 413.
276 See Richard S. v. Carpinello, 628 F. Supp. 2d 286, 288 (N.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd, 589 F.3d
75 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, Richard S. v. Hogan 562 U.S. 951 (2010).
277 See id. at 291.
278 Id. at 287; see Richard S., 589 F.3d at 76.
279 See Richard S., 589 F.3d at 83 (citing Richard S., 628 F. Supp. 2d at 293).
28 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
281 Richard S., 589 F.3d at 83 (first citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358; and then citing
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002)).
282 Richard S., 589 F.3d at 83.
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Court precedents.283 Thus, the rule that emerged from Richard S. v.
Carpinello was that the Supreme Court neither strayed from nor
expanded its core holding that for involuntary commitment to
withstand due process scrutiny, a state must prove mental illness
and dangerousness.284  "Hendricks and Crane provided an
explanation of the mental illness portion of the test: the state may
satisfy this component by proving that an individual has a mental
condition, abnormality or disorder that is sufficiently severe that he
has serious difficulty in controlling his dangerous behavior."285 On
the record before the Second Circuit, the panel affirmed denial of
the writ, concluding that "the state courts did not unreasonably
apply clearly established federal law with respect to the involuntary
commitment of Richard S., nor did they unreasonably determine the
facts with respect to his mental illness and its link to his
dangerousness. "286
5. Furlough Orders
Once committed to the custody of the Commissioner under track-
one, the Commissioner may apply for an escorted or unescorted
furlough order.287 All furloughs are subject to court approval and
must be made upon notice to the prosecuting District Attorney.288
The statute provides in pertinent part, as follows:
The Commissioner may apply for a furlough order, pursuant
to this subdivision, when a defendant is in his custody
pursuant to a commitment order, recommitment order, or
retention order and the Commissioner is of the view that,
consistent with the public safety and welfare of the
community and the defendant, the clinical condition of the
defendant warrants a granting of the privileges authorized
by a furlough order. . . . Upon receipt of such application, the
court may, on its own motion, conduct a hearing to
282 "State and federal courts have been non-uniform in their interpretation of Crane with
respect to . . . whether a separate finding" regarding serious difficulty to control behavior is
required, but Richard S. adopted the majority view. See McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 573
(7th Cir. 2010) (citing Richard S., 589 F.3d at 83-84).
284 See Richard S., 589 F.3d at 86 (citing Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 414); see also Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (discussing that involuntary commitment requires a finding
of both mental illness and dangerousness (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362,
369 (1983))).
285 Richard S., 589 F.3d at 84 (citing Crane, 534 U.S. at 413).
286 Richard S., 589 F.3d at 86.




determine whether the application should be granted, and
must conduct such hearing if a demand therefor [sic] is made
by the District Attorney. If the court finds that the issuance
of a furlough order is consistent with the public safety and
welfare of the community and the defendant, and that the
clinical condition of the defendant warrants a granting of the
privileges authorized by a furlough order, the court must
grant the application and issue a furlough order containing
any terms and conditions that the court deems necessary or
appropriate.289
In 2014, the Appellate Division addressed for the first time, in the
case of In re James Q., 290 the standard of review to be applied when
the Commissioner applies for a furlough order.291  The court
observed that the "legislature specified that the [District Attorney]
has the burden on an initial hearing seeking a commitment
order."292 "If [the Commissioner] seeks to retain a defendant in ...
custody, the legislature [likewise] placed the burden on [the
Commissioner] to establish the elements necessary for retention."293
Further, should the Commissioner seek release of the defendant,
and were the People to oppose that relief, "the legislature placed the
burden on the [District Attorney] to establish the elements
necessary for retention."294
"Unlike those situations, the legislature did not" expressly
proscribe which party "bears the burden on a furlough
application."295 The court reasoned, however, that:
Because the statute does not assign the burden and [the
Commissioner] is the only person authorized by the statute
to apply for a furlough order, the only logical conclusion is
that the legislature intended for [the Commissioner] to bear
the burden of proving that a furlough order should be
granted.296
Because the Court of Appeals had "determined that the
preponderance of the evidence standard applies to [CPL]
commitment and retention orders,"297 and "[a]bsent any legislative
289 Id.; see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 541.6(a) (2017).
290 In re James Q., 997 N.Y.S.2d 825 (App. Div. 2014).
291 See id. at 827 (citing CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 330.20(10)).
292 In re James Q., 997 N.Y.S.2d at 827 (citing CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(6)).
293 In re James Q., 997 N.Y.S.2d at 827 (citing CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(8), (9)).
294 In re James Q., 997 N.Y.S.2d at 827 (citing CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(8), (9)).
295 In re James Q., 997 N.Y.S.2d at 827 (citing CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(10)).
296 In re James Q., 997 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
29 Id. at 827-28 (first citing In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 478 (N.Y. 1995); then citing
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indication that a different standard should apply . . . [or] any
constitutional concerns, [the Third Department held] that [the
Commissioner's] burden on a furlough application is to prove the
appropriateness of a furlough order by a fair preponderance of the
credible evidence."298 The Third Department further held that it
would "review de novo Supreme Court's determination as to
whether to grant a furlough order, but defer to the [trial] court's
determination regarding [the] applicable terms and conditions" of
the furlough.299 Explaining its rationale, the court noted that the
statute provides that:
[I]f certain requirements are satisfied, "the court must grant
the application and issue a furlough order containing any
terms and conditions that the court deems necessary or
appropriate." The legislature's use of the word "must"
[according the court,] indicates a lack of discretion, such that
an order is mandated upon proof that the statutory
conditions are established. If an order is required by the
statute, however, the statute provides broad discretion to the
[trial] court regarding the inclusion of terms or conditions.300
Thus, provided that the "evidence [establishes] that a furlough
order is required" upon appellate review, the court would "only
disturb the terms and conditions of that order if [the trial c]ourt
abused its discretion in" granting them.301 On the merits, the court
determined that the Commissioner had met her burden of proof and
that several of the People's concerns about the proposed furloughs
were "unrealistic or overly alarmist regarding potential danger to
the community," particularly because the furloughs "were based
[upon] a risk management plan that required constant
supervision."302
6. Conditional Release
At any time while a track-one "defendant is in custody pursuant
People v. Escobar, 462 N.E.2d 1171, 1172-73 (N.Y. 1984); then citing In re Amir F., 941
N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (App. Div. 2012); and then citing In re Michael RR., 663 N.Y.S.2d 317, 319
(App. Div. 1997), appeals dismissed, 692 N.E.2d 132 (1998), 700 N.E.2d 1223 (1998)).
298 In re James Q., 997 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
299 Id. (emphasis added).
300 Id. (first quoting CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 330.20(10); then citing In re Kardos v. Ryan, 814
N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (App. Div. 2006); and then citing In re Phillips v. Town of Clifton Park
Water Auth., 626 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (App. Div. 1995)).
301 In re James Q., 997 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
302 Id. at 829.
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to a retention . . . or recommitment order," the Commissioner may
apply to the court that issued the order in effect, or to a superior
court in the county where the defendant is housed, for a release
order if, in the Commissioner's view, the "defendant no longer
[suffers from] a dangerous mental disorder and is no[t] ... mentally
ill."303 "The Commissioner must give ten days written notice to the
District Attorney, the defendant, counsel for the defendant, and the
Mental Hygiene Legal Service."304
Upon receipt of the application, the judge "must promptly [hold] a
hearing to determine the defendant's present mental condition."30 5
"If the [judge] finds that the defendant [suffers from] a dangerous
mental disorder, [he] must deny the application for a release order[;
but if he] finds that the defendant does not [suffer from] a
dangerous mental disorder but is mentally ill, [he] must issue a
transfer order," with an order of conditions, assuming the
"defendant is [still] confined in a secure facility." 306 But "[i]f the
[judge] finds that the defendant does not [suffer from] a dangerous
mental disorder and is not mentally ill, [he] must grant the
[Commissioner's] application and issue a release order" with an
order of conditions.3 0 7 Further:
The order of conditions issued in conjunction with a release
order shall incorporate a written service plan prepared by a
psychiatrist familiar with the defendant's case history and
approved by the court, and shall contain any conditions that
the court determines to be reasonably necessary or
appropriate. It shall be the responsibility of the
Commissioner to determine that such defendant is receiving
the services specified in the written service plan and is
complying with any conditions specified in such plan and the
order of conditions.308
A recent Appellate Division, Third Department, decision applying
the statutory standards is In re Arto ZZ.309 In this case, the
defendant was a developmentally disabled individual confined in
the custody of OPWDD.3 10 The court observed that:






30 In re Arto ZZ., 994 N.Y.S.2d 455 (App. Div. 2014). Arto ZZ. is the same respondent
whose transfer to a non-secure facility was the subject of litigation. See id. at 456.
310 See id. at 456.
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For purposes of CPL 330.20, a person with a developmental
disability is considered "mentally ill" if he or she "is in need
of care and treatment as a resident in the in-patient services
of a developmental center or other residential facility for the
. . . developmentally disabled under the jurisdiction of
[OPWDD] ."311
Under the statutory scheme, the People had the burden to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant remained a
"mentally ill" person and thus was in need of retention.312 Although
the defendant in this case "undeniably" was diagnosed with
multiple mental health conditions in addition to being intellectually
disabled, such diagnoses are, as a matter of law, "insufficient to
prove that he was 'mentally ill' under the applicable statutory
definition."313
The report and affidavit of [the Commissioner's] expert
indicated that respondent had improved such that he no
longer required inpatient care and instead could function in
a supervised intermediate care facility. The [People's] expert
disagreed, opining that respondent met the definition of
''mentally ill" because he needed constant supervision.
Supreme Court reasonably discounted that expert's opinion
because . . . he generally worked with mentally ill
individuals who did not have developmental disabilities and
he was not sufficiently familiar with OPWDD facilities and
procedures. He also engaged in baseless speculation about
respondent possibly eloping from the proposed residence and
the potential difficulties in locating or returning him; [with
the Appellate Division holding that] such speculation cannot
support the [People's] burden. [Further, c]ontrary to the
expert's testimony, [a defendant can] be deemed no longer
mentally ill [under the statute,] even if he ha[s] a psychiatric
diagnosis and still [requires] supervision[, because a]
"release order directs [the Commissioner] to terminate the
defendant's in-patient status without ending his [or her]
311 See id. at 457 (quoting CRIM. PROc. LAW § 330.20(1)(d)).
312 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(12); People v. Escobar, 462 N.E.2d 1171, 1172 (N.Y.
1984).
313 See In re Arto ZZ., 994 N.Y.S.2d at 457 (first citing CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(1)(d); and
then citing In re David B., 766 N.E.2d 565, 573 (N.Y. 2002)) ('[T]he statutory language limits
the class of retained mentally ill individuals to those who must have inpatient care and
treatment,' among other requirements." (citations omitted)).
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responsibility for the defendant."314
A release order is to be distinguished from a discharge order
under the statutory scheme:
The [C]ommissioner may apply for a discharge order . . .
when [the individual] has been [continually] on an out-
patient status [(subject to an order of conditions)] for three
years . . . and the [person] . . . no longer has a dangerous
mental disorder and is no longer mentally ill and . . . the
issuance of a discharge order is consistent with the public
safety and welfare of the community and the [individual]. 315
7. Recommitment
For defendants, perhaps the most onerous aspect of the statutory
scheme is the authority of the Commissioner or the District
Attorney to seek the defendant's recommitment to secure
psychiatric confinement when it is alleged that a conditionally
released defendant has lapsed into a dangerous mental disorder.3 16
Specifically, at any time while an order of conditions remains in
effect, the Commissioner or a District Attorney may apply to the
court that issued the order, or a superior court in the county where
the track-one defendant then resides, for a recommitment order
when, in the applicant's view, the defendant again exhibits a
dangerous mental disorder.317 "Upon receipt of [the] application[,]
the [judge] must order the defendant to appear . . . for a hearing to
determine [his mental status]."318 This order takes the form of a
written notice of the time and place of appearance, served either
personally or by mail.3 19 Should "the defendant fail[] to appear in
court as directed, the [judge] may issue a warrant . . . [directing a]
peace officer . . . to take [him] into custody and bring him before the
court, . . . [and] may direct that the defendant be confined in an
appropriate institution."320 At the hearing, the applicant must
satisfy to the judge that the defendant suffers from a dangerous
314 In re Arto ZZ., 994 N.Y.S.2d at 458 (first citing In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 481
(N.Y. 1995); and then quoting In re Allen B. v. Sproat, 14 N.E.3d 970, 973 (N.Y. 2014)); see
also CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(1)(m) (defining "release order").
a15 CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 330.20(13).
316 See id. § 330.20(14).
317 Id. Even if an order of conditions is not currently in effect, such an order may be issued
nunc pro tunc so as to not defeat the court's subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a
recommitment application. See In re Lloyd Z., 575 N.Y.S.2d 327, 327-28 (App. Div. 1991).
318 CRIM. PROC. LAw § 330.20(14).
319 Id.
320 Id.
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mental disorder.321 "If the applicant succeeds, the judge must issue
a recommitment order, again consigning the defendant to a secure
facility for care and treatment for six months. The periodic
retention reviews then begin anew."322
As interpreted by the Court of Appeals, a defendant can be
returned to psychiatric confinement under the CPL without the
enhanced procedural due process protections afforded to people
subject to civil hospitalization, even if the person was placed in
track-two or track-three at his initial hearing, upon a finding that
he did not have a dangerous mental disorder.323 The appellate
courts in New York have been completely "unpersuaded that the
initial findings of a . . . criminal court placing [defendants] in one of
the three available 'tracks' has any constitutional significance."324
"All such persons have committed criminal acts, and this underlies
the permissible distinction between them and all others ....
Federal constitutional challenges to the New York statutory
scheme have to date failed, albeit narrowly.326 In addition to the
recommitment remedy, the Court of Appeals also sanctioned the
issuance of temporary confinement orders, authorizing the
detention of conditionally released defendants for the purpose of
evaluation, even though there is no statutory authorization for such
a procedure.327 Reversing the Appellate Division,328 a divided Court
of Appeals held that the legislature did not "displace a court's
ability to fashion" a remedy to "detect or redress the deterioration of
a track-one defendant's mental health," and further refused to
accept the defendant's constitutional arguments.329 The majority
rejected the arguments that the more broadly applicable provisions
of the Mental Hygiene Law are available to address the
321 See id.
322 See In re Allen B. v. Sproat, 14 N.E.3d 970, 974 (N.Y. 2014) (first citing CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 330.20(14); and then citing id. § 330.20(1)(0).
323 See People v. Stone, 536 N.E.2d 1137, 1139-40 (N.Y. 1989).
324 In re Lloyd Z., 575 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (App. Div. 1991).
325 Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983)).
326 See Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
327 See In re Allen B., 14 N.E.3d at 978 n.2, 979.
328 See id. at 979; In re Robert T. v. Sproat, 955 N.Y.S.2d 134, 140-41 (App. Div. 2012).
329 In re Allen B., 14 N.E.3d at 978. Judge Lippman's dissent in In re Allen B. v. Sproat
noted:
While the state urge[d] that its objective is modest-simply to allow for the "effective
examination" of the defendant-[the remedy was] remarkably vague about what that
[would] entail, either temporally or psychiatrically, and [that] it [was], in any event,
axiomatic that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of
liberty that requires due process protection."
Id. at 981 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).
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circumstances of any individual in the community who might
require evaluation for admission to a hospital.330
C. Revisiting George L. and the Presumption of Dangerousness
The Court of Appeals' seminal precedent in George L. seized upon
the "presumption that the mental illness found to have caused the
defendant's dangerousness continues after the commission of the
crime, is even stronger in cases like the one before us where the
defendant's 'antisocial behavior' constituted a crime of violence."331
The authority for this statement was a law review student Note
observing that the recent commission of a violent act significantly
increases the probability that an individual will commit further
such acts in the future.332 Quoting the Note, the Court of Appeals
stated: "This judgment is not simply a popular notion; the clinical
consensus is that a history of violent behavior in an individual is
the single best predictor of future violence [and] is supported by
studies of insanity acquittees, which indicate a recidivism rate
equal to that of prison populations."3 3 3
Combined with the George L. decision in 1995 was an
administrative decision made by the OMH in 1997 to "utilize the
HCR-20 risk assessment instrument . . . in part, [as] an attempt to
implement the George L. [decision] through a validated risk
assessment instrument."334 According to Miraglia and Hall, though
not a "perfect fit" with George L., the HCR-20 provided "both
contextual and longitudinal perspectives on violence risk
assessment as well as a focus on risk management strategies that
program managers felt was a practical approach to implementing
the tenets of case law." 335 Nonetheless, it is apparent that decisions
made at the Commissioner's office to advance a person from secure
330 See In re Allen B., 14 N.E.3d at 982 n.2.
331 In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 480 (N.Y. 1995).
32 See id. (quoting Ingber, supra note 184, at 295-96).
333 In re George L., 648 N.E.2d at 480 (quoting Ingber, supra note 184, at 295-96).
However, the author went on to conclude that "[t]he effect of a violent act and subsequent
insanity acquittal on the acquittee's release rights has temporal limits." Ingber, supra note
184, at 326 ("The state's justification for imposing obstacles to the acquittee's release must
eventually lapse, and any further confinement of the acquittee must be justified under
procedures identical to those that apply in the case of civil committees.").
3 Miraglia & Hall, supra note 71, at 526 ("The HCR-20 is a structured-judgment risk
assessment instrument that is frequently used in forensic populations. It includes a scale of
10 historical domains, 5 clinical domains, and 5 risk management items that the research
literature suggests are related to violence in a forensic mental health population.").
335 Id. ("OMH conducted systemwide training on the use of the HCR-20 and incorporated
the 20 domains throughout its multi-tiered review process.").
Justice for Individuals with Mental Disabilities
to non-secure (or civil confinement) "became more structured and
complex over time" and also occurred during a time that the OMH
became, according to Miraglia and Hall, "increasingly risk
averse."336
Lengths of stay became longer for people committed under the
CPL despite the fact that the length of hospitalization had little or
no effect on re-arrest.337 Further, statistical trends demonstrated
that the "while the number of [not responsible] admissions to
hospitals in New York State . . . declined over the past three
decades from a high of 77 in 1982 to a low of 22 in 2008, the length
of hospitalization of these individuals increased significantly."3 38
Over "40 percent of those admitted in the 1980s were released into
the community within seven years of admission."339 During the
1990s, "only 21 percent of the admissions were released into the
community within seven years."3 40 "At the [beginning] of the last
decade, only eight percent of admissions were released within a
seven-year period."341  As stated by Miraglia and Hall, the
"treatment of mental illness is an extraordinarily individualized
endeavor," and the length of stay for defendants found not
responsible in New York had less to do with "treatment resistance
or cognitive limitations," and rather, was "clearly influenced by
exogenous legal considerations and administrative practices."342
As the Court of Appeals held in 1979 in In re Torsney: "Beyond
automatic commitment of persons found not guilty by reason of
mental disease or defect for a reasonable period to determine their
present sanity, justification for distinctions in treatment between
persons involuntarily committed under the Mental Hygiene Law
and persons committed under CPL 330.20 draws impermissibly
thin."3 4 3  Largely based upon lingering presumptions that the
defendant acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect is a
perpetually dangerous person, the result is a commitment scheme
by interpretation and application that is increasingly onerous,
bearing little resemblance to article 9 (civil) commitments.344
[D]efendants committed to the custody of the Commissioner
33 Id.




341 Id. at 524-25.
342 Id. at 533.
343 In re Torsney, 394 N.E.2d 262, 266 (N.Y. 1979).
344 See id. at 265-66, 271.
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pursuant to . . . 330.20 have significantly longer lengths of
stay than [would] be warranted by their clinical condition
. . . . [F]or those defendants found to have a dangerous
mental disorder at the time of their initial hearing, the
[District Attorney] will have standing to appear in all future
proceedings, the commitment standard is relaxed (the need
for retention can be established by a mere preponderance of
the evidence),345 and clinical discretion to grant furloughs,
conditionally release, or discharge the defendant may only be
exercised by court order.346
It is also the reality that a commitment under CPL section 330.20
can result in lifetime supervision.347 "That is because even upon
conditional release from the hospital, court-imposed conditions of
supervision may be applied indefinitely upon a mere finding of 'good
cause shown."'
348
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM IN NEW YORK
A. Amendment of CPL Section 730.40
As discussed above, in 1988, the Westchester County Supreme
Court struck down the automatic 90-day commitment in the case of
Ritter v. Surles.349 Yet there is considerable confusion about the
implications of Ritter v. Surles in practice. Town and village
justices, county court judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in
New York are often not aware of Ritter v. Surles and the fact that
there is a declining infrastructure of in-patient beds to receive
criminal defendants, especially in the OPWDD system. Ritter
should be codified and the 90-day automatic commitment repealed.
B. Amendment of CPL Section 730.60(1)
CPL section 730.60(1) provides, in part, that:
When a local criminal court issues a final or temporary order
of observation or an order of commitment, it must forward
3 This lower burden of proof is in contrast to the clear and convincing evidence standard
afforded all other candidates for civil commitment in New York, even sex offenders who have
been convicted, not acquitted, of the offenses providing the jurisdictional predicate for the
commitment. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(d) (McKinney 2017).
316 Shea, supra note 11, at 14.
3 See, e.g., In re Oswald N., 661 N.E.2d 679, 682 (N.Y. 1995).
318 Shea, supra note 11, at 14.
3 Ritter v. Surles, 545 N.Y.S.2d 962, 966 (Sup. ct. 1988).
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such order and a copy of the examination reports and the
accusatory instrument to the Commissioner, and, if
available, a copy of the pre-sentence report. Upon receipt
thereof, the Commissioner must designate an appropriate
institution operated by the department of mental hygiene in
which the defendant is to be placed, provided, however, that
the Commissioner may designate an appropriate hospital for
placement of a defendant for whom a final order of
observation has been issued, where such hospital is licensed
by the office of mental health and has agreed to accept, upon
referral by the Commissioner, defendants subject to final
orders of observation issued under this subdivision. The
sheriff must hold the defendant in custody pending such
designation by the Commissioner, and when notified of the
designation, the sheriff must deliver the defendant to the
superintendent of such institution.350
Further, section 730.60 provides that if found incapacitated under a
final or temporary order of observation, the sheriff "must hold the
defendant in custody pending such designation by the
Commissioner."35 1
There is no time limit by which the Commissioner must make a
designation and the provision is particularly onerous and
constitutionally infirm if it is applied to a person who was evaluated
as an outpatient.352 Section 730.60 should be amended to clarify
that defendants evaluated as outpatients should not be held in
custody pending designation and otherwise to require the
Commissioner to designate a facility within a time certain so as not
to run afoul of the defendant's due process rights.353 As discussed
earlier, litigation in Pennsylvania demonstrated that when mental
health systems lack resources, considerable delays result to the
detriment of defendants with mental disabilities awaiting
placements.354 Given the availability of outpatient commitment in
New York, it is also time to require that psychiatric examiners
address in their reports whether an incapacitated defendant is a
350 CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.60(1).
35 Id.
-2 See, e.g., supra Part III(A)(5).
35 See, e.g., Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[Oregon
State Hospital] violate[d] the substantive due process rights of incapacitated criminal
defendants when it refuse[d] to admit them in a timely manner.").
3 See, e.g., J.H. v. Dallas, AM. CIv. LIBERTIES UNION-PA., http://www.aclupa.org/dallas




candidate for outpatient as opposed to inpatient restoration.355
C. Codification of Jackson v. Indiana
The current CPL article 730 was enacted in 1970.356 In 1972, the
U.S. Supreme Court held in Jackson v. Indiana that:
[A] person charged by [the] State with a criminal offense who
is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to
trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the
foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the
case, then the state must either institute the customary civil
confinement proceeding that would be required to commit
indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant.
Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant
probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued
commitment must be justified by progress toward that
goal.357
The constitutional limitation on the confinement of an
incapacitated criminal defendant as enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Jackson has never been codified in New York.35 8 Across
jurisdictions in the United States, "[a] number of states base ...
time limits on research [demonstrating] that most [defendants] will
be restored [to capacity] within six months to a year, and [that]
continued treatment and detention to restore competency beyond
[that] time period is unnecessary."359 Yet other states base the
maximum treatment period on other conditions, such as the
maximum possible sentence for the alleged offense.3 60
66 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30 (codifying the requirements for determining capacity, but
lacking any stipulation regarding inpatient or outpatient candidacy).
- See CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 730.
a5 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
3- See generally CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 730 (lacking any codification of the Jackson
standard for time limits); People v. Elizabeth P., 935 N.Y.S.2d 833, 838 (Sup. Ct. 2011)
("When Jackson became law in 1972, New York did not amend article 730 to address Jackson
hearings, nor did it create any new statutory scheme to set forth the procedural mechanisms
for Jackson relief.").
"5 JUSTICE POLICY INST., WHEN TREATMENT IS PUNISHMENT: THE EFFECTS OF MARYLAND'S
INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES 2 (2011), http://www.justice
policy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/when-treatment-is-punishment-full report.pdf.
30 See id. at 34-35. The report contains a chart with maximum defined capacity
restoration period for each state in the United States. Id.
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Currently, the only temporal limitation of the permissible period
in New York of an article 730 retention is that the retention "must
not exceed two-thirds of the authorized maximum term of
imprisonment for the highest class felony charged in the
indictment."3 6 1  Upon reaching the two-thirds maximum, the
indictment is dismissed and the defendant may only continuously
be retained as a civil patient.362 Currently, rights guaranteed by
Jackson may be vindicated only through motion practice,363 which
may be commenced by the defendant or the Commissioner.364
However, albeit rarely, District Attorneys will also commence
Jackson motions in some cases to relieve counties of the burden of
paying the cost of article 730 confinement.365 It is time for article
730 to be examined by the legislature, taking into account both
social science research and case law developments, such as the
Court of Appeals decision in People v Lewis.366 In Lewis, the Court
of Appeals held that upon conversion to civil status following a
Jackson motion, the defendant no longer is entitled to credit for
time served toward the two-thirds maximum and dismissal of the
indictment.367
As twenty other states currently do,3 6 8 New York should have a
maximum period of court imposed retention for restoration that has
a nexus to social science research and that also takes into account
the needs of special populations, such as those with intellectual
disabilities or dementia.
361 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.50(3).
362 See id. § 730.50(4).
363 See, e.g., Elizabeth P., 935 N.Y.S.2d at 838 ("Jackson relief is sought by established
procedural mechanisms, outside the express provisions of article 730.").
364 Shea, supra note 11, at 8 n.3 ("The Commissioner having custody of the client (Office of
Mental Health or OPWDD), defense counsel or the Mental Hygiene Legal Service may seek
Jackson relief. . . .").
-5 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 43.03(c) (McKinney 2017) ("Fees due the department for
such services shall be paid by the county in which such court is located. . . ."); CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 730.20(7) ("Such fees and traveling expenses and the costs of sending a defendant to
another place of detention or to a hospital for examination, of his maintenance therein and of
returning him shall, when approved by the court, be a charge of the county in which the
defendant is being tried.").
3- People v. Lewis, 742 N.E.2d 601 (N.Y. 2000).
367 See id. at 607 ("Incidental to the exercise of his rights under Jackson v. Indiana, this
defendant brought himself outside the four corners of CPL article 730 and, thus, was no
longer entitled to avail himself of CPL 730.50's dismissal provisions, a prospective benefit
that existed before he invoked his rights under Jackson.").




Court rules implementing CPL article 730369 need to be updated.
Currently, the regulations contemplate commitment only to the
custody of OMH. 37 0 The regulations should be amended to recognize
that a person can be committed to either OMH or OPWDD. Also,
references in part 111 to the "Mental Health Information Service"
(MHLS's predecessor agency) should be changed to "Mental Hygiene
Legal Service." In addition, section 111.8 of the rules address
official forms.371 The regulation provides that "[florms promulgated
by the Chief Administrator of the Courts and the Commissioner of
Mental Health, or either of them, shall be the official forms for
uniform use throughout the state in implementation of article 730 of
the Criminal Procedure Law." 372 At this time of this writing, there
are no official forms.
It is time to consider anew the benefit of official forms following
the decision in Hirschfeld v. Stone.373 In that case, incapacitated
defendants confined under article 730 challenged the release of
personal information, including HIV status, in fitness reports
conveyed to criminal courts.374  The District Court issued a
preliminary injunction, holding that the state's interests in
including personal information in reports submitted to courts and
used to determine capacity were outweighed by defendant's privacy
interests.375 The Hirschfeld v. Stone litigation concluded upon the
entry of a consent order endorsed by the District Court, which
resulted in the creation of a model competency report.376 However,
the model competency report is not uniform because OPWDD was
not a party in the Hirschfeld litigation.377 Toward the goal of
promoting consistent practices, official forms should be
promulgated.
869 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REG. tit. 22, § 111.2 (2017).
370 See id. § 111.4.
a7 Id. § 111.8.
372 Id.
373 See Hirschfeld v. Stone, 193 F.R.D. 175 (S.D.N.Y 2000).
374 See id. at 181.
3 See id. at 192.
6 See id. at 192, 193.
377 See id. at 178.
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E. Special Populations
1. People with Intellectual Disabilities
In 1990, a law was enacted "directing the Law Revision
Commission to study provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law and
Correction Law to determine their impact [upon people] with
mental retardation who are accused of' crimes and to commend
statutory revisions.3 7 8 The study was to take into account the
"cognitive ability and adaptive behavior" of persons with mental
retardation and was to be conducted in consultation with executive
branch agencies, the Mental Hygiene Legal Service, the
Commission on Correction, and prosecutor and defense associations,
among others.379 While a bill was never enacted as a result of the
Law Revision Commission investigation into these compelling
issues,380 there is no question that over twenty-five years later,
people with developmental disabilities continue to encounter
significant difficulties and great risk in the criminal justice system.
2. People with Mental Disabilities Charged with Sex Offenses
Incapacitated defendants and those found not responsible are
susceptible to civil management as sex offenders under article 10 of
the New York State Mental Hygiene LaW381 even though they have
never been convicted of sex offenses.382 The jurisdiction of article 10
attaches to this special population because the statutory definition
of "detained sex offender" includes:
A person charged with a sex offense who has been
determined to be an incapacitated person with respect to
that offense and has been committed pursuant to article
seven hundred thirty of the criminal procedure law ... [and
a] person charged with a sex offense who has been found not
responsible by reason of mental disease or defect for the
commission of that offense.383
The Appellate Division, Third Department, determined that the
application of article 10 to incapacitated criminal defendants does
378 Assemb. B. 11695-A, 213th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1990) (enacted).
3 See id.
- See id.
381 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(a), (d), (e) (McKinney 2017).
382 See id. § 10.05(d), (e).
3- Id. § 10.03(g)(2)-(3).
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not violate their constitutional rights.384 In part, the appellate
panel was persuaded that the "statute is not punitive in purpose or
effect, and the very fact that incompetent respondents-who cannot
be held responsible for criminal acts-fall under the rubric of
Mental Hygiene Law article 10 demonstrates a lack of retributive
intent; petitioner 'is not seeking retribution for a past misdeed."'
385
Aside from the defendant's capacity to proceed, it remains an
open constitutional question in New York as to whether a person
who has never been convicted of a sex offense can nonetheless be
subject to indeterminate confinement as a sex offender.386 For those
defendants found not responsible, they have admitted to the facts
underlying the offense or there has been a judicial finding to that
effect.387  Thus, the constitutional considerations differ from those
that apply to incapacitated defendants. Nonetheless, defendants
found not responsible may only be released from confinement upon
a finding that they no longer suffer from a dangerous mental
disorder and are not mentally ill.388 A statutory incongruence arises
3m In re State v. Daniel 00., 928 N.Y.S.2d 787, 795 (App. Div. 2011). There was no further
appeal to the Court of Appeals because the Appellate Division decision and order was non-
final and the respondent in that case was later order confined under article 15 of the Mental
Hygiene Law, and not article 10, pursuant to a settlement by the parties and in an
unreported order. See In re State v. Daniel 00., 995 N.E.2d 849, 849 (N.Y. 2013) ("Appeal
dismissed . . . by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that the stipulation and
order of Supreme Court is not a final judgment . . . because the Mental Hygiene Law article
10 application was withdrawn without prejudice to renewal in the event of certain
conditions.").
386 Daniel 00., 928 N.Y.S.2d at 793 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362
(1997)).
386 The Mental Hygiene Legal Service ('MHLS") sued in its agency capacity in federal
court challenging certain provisions of article 10 as facially unconstitutional. See Mental
Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Cuomo, 785 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The District Court
issued a preliminary injunction holding, in part, that due process "plainly requires that an
individual be found to have committed a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt before
the state may subject him or her to the stigma of being labeled a 'sexual offender."' Id. at 216.
The federal court enjoined the state from proceeding under article 10 against "[any] person
charged with a sex offense [and] determined to be an incapacitated person with respect to
that offense ... pursuant to [CPL article 730] . . . unless [there was a jury finding, or a
finding by the court if a jury trial was waived, that,] beyond a reasonable doubt that the
[person] engaged in the conduct constituting the underlying offense." Id. at 211 n.2, 213 n.8.
The injunction was later reversed and the complaint dismissed with the Second Circuit
holding that MHLS did not possess associational or third party agency standing to interpose
the constitutional claims on behalf of its constituents. See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v.
Cuomo, 609 F. App'x 693, 695 (2d Cir. 2015).
38 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.15(5)(a) (McKinney 2017). Before accepting a plea of
not responsible, the court must be satisfied that each element of the offense can be
established beyond a reasonable doubt; in a trial, the People have the burden of proving the
elements of the offense charged. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970); Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 794, 795 (1952).
388 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(12); see also supra Part IV(A)(6) (discussing conditional
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because the defendant's conditional release provides the
jurisdictional predicate for the invocation of article 10, potentially
subjecting the defendant to civil management as a sex offender.38 9
Defendants found not responsible are already subject to inordinate
lengths of stay largely unrelated to their clinical condition and
potentially lifetime supervision.390  There seems no legitimate
purpose to also subject them to article 10 jurisdiction when they are
otherwise subject to court mandated treatment and supervision
under the CPL. The potential for people with severe mental
disabilities to be subject to article 10 is not a hypothetical concern,
and whether they can receive treatment consistent with their
clinical needs remains to be determined.391
F. Reexamination of CPL Section 330.20
Stakeholders in the CPL section 330.20 process might find
common ground for chapter amendments. For instance, consensus
for a revision to the statutory framework that would authorize
recommitment to either a secure or non-secure facility would be
consistent with the defendant's needs, permit the Commissioners to
better allocate scarce resources, and still protect public safety.
Currently, the statute only permits the defendant's return to secure
confinement upon a recommitment application being granted.392
Proposed changes to the statute that would eliminate references
to "mental retardation" in favor of "developmental disability" and
corresponding changes of "OMRDD" to "OPWDD" are long overdue
and would not be a point of controversy. Further, subdivision 21 of
section 330.20 should be amended to conform to the Appellate
Division, Third Department, decision in In re Jill ZZ.393 In that
release).
389 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.05(b) (McKinney 2017) ("When it appears to an agency
with jurisdiction that a person who may be a detained sex offender is nearing an anticipated
release from confinement, the agency shall give notice of that fact to the Attorney General
and to the Commissioner of Mental Health.").
390 See, e.g., In re Oswald N., 661 N.E.2d 679, 682-83 (N.Y. 1995) (citing Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 368-70 (1983)).
391 Of the 356 people confined in article 10 secure treatment facilities in October 2015, 69
were cognitively impaired and 33 were seriously mentally ill. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MENTAL HYGIENE LAw ARTICLE
10, at 13 (2016). The OMH operates three secure treatment facilities in New York State and
maintains that the needs of residents who are mentally ill, developmentally disabled, and
cognitively impaired are met through special treatment tracks. See id. at 11-12.
392 See CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(14).
393 In re Jill ZZ., 591 N.Y.S.2d 616, 618-19 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 629
N.E.2d 1040 (1994). In In re Jill ZZ., a track-two defendant sought to appeal from an order of
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case, it was held that the existing statutory restriction on the
appeal of certain orders as of right under section 330.20 violated the
New York State Constitution.3 94
Finally, a substantial change many would welcome is for the
defendant to convert to civil status or be released upon reaching the
maximum sentence that could have been imposed if the defendant
had been convicted. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Jones v.
United States held that a person could be confined as an insanity
acquittee for as long as she is mentally ill and dangerous.395 Thus,
providing for a temporal limitation on the length of a CPL section
330.20 commitment is not a constitutional imperative. Nonetheless,
social science research indisputably demonstrates that defendants
committed to the custody of the Commissioner following a not
responsible adjudication are subject to considerably longer lengths
of stay as compared to civil patients.396 Social science research
provides impetus for legislative reform as well as the following legal
rationale:
The effect of a violent act and subsequent insanity acquittal
on the acquittee's release rights has temporal limits. The
state's justification for imposing obstacles to the acquittee's
release must eventually lapse, and any further confinement
of the acquittee must be justified under procedures identical
to those that apply in the case of civil committees. Such a
convergence is implicit in a prediction-prevention approach,
under which confinement is based on prediction. The
significance of a violent act and insanity acquittal lessens
over time, while more recent diagnostic information about
the acquittee's dangerousness due to mental illness increases
in its importance. At some point, the type of information
that tends to establish the dangerous mental illness of
violent acquittees must be considered indistinguishable from
that which bears on the status of civil committees, and the
peculiar posture of violent acquittees becomes irrelevant
conditions. Id. at 616. As enacted, section 330.20(21) would foreclose that relief. Id. at 618.
The Appellate Division held that the defendant's appellate r medies were guaranteed as of
right by the New York State Constitution. See id. at 618. On the merits, the appellate panel
reversed the trial court and vacated the order of conditions. See id. 616-18. The Court of
Appeals reversed on the merits, but left undisturbed the Appellate Division's holding that the
defendant had an appeal as of right from an order of conditions. See In re Jill ZZ., 629
N.E.2d at 1040, 1042-43.
39 See In re Jill ZZ., 591 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4(k)).
39, Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1982).
396 See Ingber, supra note 184, at 327.
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from a prediction-prevention standpoint.397
Thus, the question therefore is not whether procedural
convergence should occur between the two groups, but when it
should occur. In the absence of an empirical, prediction-based
durational limit on defendant's track-one status, the hypothetical
sentencing approach would best balance the interests of the public
and the rights of defendants found not responsible.
V. TOWARD THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
The intent of this article was to merge theory and practice and
reveal miscarriages that are prevalent in our criminal justice
system when defendants are mentally ill, developmental disabled,
or burdened with cognitive deficits that impact upon their capacity
and criminal responsibility. Thousands of individuals with mental
disabilities languish in prisons and jails.39 8 The reasons for this
tragedy have been explored in this article and are complex, but the
conclusion is inescapable that the widespread closure of psychiatric
hospitals contributed to an increase in the arrest and incarceration
of individuals with mental disabilities. Our legal system must
confront this problem.
When adjudicating the rights and interests of defendants with
significant disabilities, Professor Perlin has persuasively
demonstrated through his prolific scholarship that sanist3 9 9 legal
myths dominate our legal system.400 There is no doubt that mental
illness is one of the most stigmatized of social conditions and
discriminatory attitudes pervade toward people with mental
illness.401 The stereotype of mentally ill individuals as "ticking time
bombs" for instance, creeps into decisional law and serves as an
example of myth trumping science.402 To counter the biases that
391 Id. at 326-27. The author refers to his proposal as the "hypothetical sentencing"
approach. Id. at 328.
398 TORREY ET AL., supra note 47, at 5.
11 As Professor Perlin explains:
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational
prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism,
homophobia and ethnic bigotry. It permeates all aspects of mental disability law, and
affects all participants in the mental disability law system: fact finders, counsel, expert
and lay witnesses.
Michael L. Perlin, "You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks": Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9
CLINIcAL L. REV. 683, 683 (2003).
-n Id.
401 See Varshney et al., supra note 10, at 223, 225.
402 See Application of Noel, 601 P.2d 1152, 1167 (Kan. 1979) (comparing considering
whether a person who successfully invoked the insanity defense should be released from a
1099
Albany Law Review
penetrate legal processes, and to address the interests of people
with mental disabilities who are harmed by incarceration and over-
punished, Perlin and many others advocate adoption of therapeutic
jurisprudence.403  Broadly speaking, "[t]herapeutic [j]urisprudence
examines whether the law and legal institutions have healing
effects or detrimental effects."404  "Therapeutic jurisprudence
proposes reforms that enable the legal system to focus more on
problem-solving without sacrificing the rule of law and the
principles that our legal system serves, such as predictability and
stability."405  Therapeutic jurisprudence supports an "ethic of
care."406
Not surprisingly, Perlin describes a robust insanity defense as an
essential element of therapeutic jurisprudence.407 This article has
explored the many ingrained disincentives to invoking the insanity
defense across jurisdictions, including in New York. Professor
Perlin quotes from the late Judge David Bazelon, who said: "By
declaring a small number not responsible, we emphasize the
responsibility of others,"408 and "the existence of the defense gives
coherence to the entire fabric of criminal sentencing."409 It is telling
that in New York State, thousands of individuals with mental
disabilities are currently confined in state correctional facilities, yet,
in contrast, the number of not responsible admissions to hospitals
has "declined over the past three decades from a high of 77 in 1982
to a low of 22 in 2008."410
In New York and other jurisdictions, proper application of the
insanity defense coupled with reasonable lengths of stay in
hospitals following a plea or verdict of not responsible could
potentially begin to remedy the tragedy that has unfolded in our
hospital to shipping nitroglycerine).
43 Perlin, supra note 399, at 719.
- Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Appeal of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 223, 223 (2000).
405 Id.
406 Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law
School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINIcAL L. REV. 605,
605-07 (2006) ("This model contemplates lawyers practicing with an ethic of care and
heightened interpersonal skills, who seek to prevent legal difficulties or repetitive legal
problems for their clients through sensitive counseling, advance planning, creative problem
solving, careful drafting, and the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques.").
40 See Michael L. Perlin, "Infinity Goes up on Trial": Sanism, Pretextuality, and the
Representation of Defendants with Mental Disabilities 5, 36 (Feb. 18, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2734762.
408 Id. at 36.
409 Id.
410 Shea, supra note 11, at 14; see Miraglia & Hall, supra note 71, at 524.
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country resulting in the criminalization of people with mental
disabilities. A viable insanity defense should be promoted along
with criminal sentencing that considers an offenders' vulnerability
when meting out punishment.411 Recognizing and compensating for
the vulnerabilities of offenders with mental disabilities should yield
more humane sentences, increase the use of alternative sanctions,
and prompt the reform of prison conditions.412 For those people
with mental disabilities who are subject to criminal processes,
mental health courts and other diversion models should be
expanded.4 13
VI. CONCLUSION
Ameliorating the devastating negative consequences of criminal
sanctions upon people with mental disabilities will no doubt lead to
improved life outcomes, fewer people in jails and prisons, and
reduced costs for state and local governments.414 Resources should
be enhanced through state surveys to determine the actual bed
capacity that is needed for civil patients and criminal court referrals
to the mental health system.415 For those attorneys who practice in
New York, confronting bias and understanding the intricacies of the
statutory schemes governing the retention care and treatment of
incapacitated defendants and those found not responsible can
further individual client objectives. A robust insanity defense is
essential. Criminal diverse models need to be expanded. In the
broader societal context, through determined advocacy and
considerate application of therapeutic justice principles, lawyers
and judges can contribute greatly toward reform of a criminal
justice system that for more than a generation has consigned far too
may defendants laboring under significant mental disabilities to jail
or prison.
411 Cf. Johnston, supra note 9, at 178 (discussing how certain punishments can constitute
cruel and unusual punishment for those with mental illness).
412 See id.
41 The New York State Office of Court Administration reported that as of January 1, 2017,
there were twenty-nine mental health courts in operation, handling over 9,420 cases. See
Mental Health Courts, NYCOURTS.GOV, www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem-solving/mhlhome
.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
414 See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 359, at 31.
415 See TORREY ET AL., supra note 47, at 12.
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